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Abstract   
Worldwide, the risks from natural and technological hazards has been mounting at an 
accelerating rate, improvements in forecasting and warning systems have reduced 
deaths, however monetary losses from disasters are overwhelming (Burby, 2004). Pre 
event planning for recovery helps to resolve issues before a disaster so recovery is 
more efficient and effective. It also ensures that the window of opportunity can be 
used to implement hazard mitigation measures to reduce the vulnerability of the area 
with the aim of improving resilience for the next disaster.  
International case studies were examined, the Northridge earthquake being the most 
successful recovery while Hurricane Katrina the least. The recovery of the Napier 
1931 earthquake was chosen as a New Zealand case study; to date this is the country’s 
worst disaster. Overall the recovery of Napier was a success, shops were opened in 
temporary premises to keep the economy going and mitigation measures were 
included in the rebuilding. The earthquake has had important flow on effects on the 
way that disasters are managed in New Zealand. To create pre event plans in New 
Zealand legislation needs to be modified, including recovery plans and development 
of shortcuts to reduce some procedures which lengthen the recovery process. These 
plans need to take into account our national vulnerability as well as regional 
vulnerabilities. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
A natural hazard becomes a disaster when it affects a community that is exposed and 
vulnerable (Uitto, 1997, Alexander, 1993 in Cross, 2001). World-wide, the risks from 
natural and technological hazards has been mounting at an accelerating pace, 
improvements in forecasting and warning systems have reduced deaths, however 
monetary losses from disasters are overwhelming (Burby, 2004). As the population of 
the world increases there is increasing pressure on cities to expand to accommodate 
the growing population, land is progressively becoming more of a scarce resource for 
housing, business, infrastructure, tourism or agriculture. For this reason development 
often occurs on land subject to natural hazards, so this investment adds to the cost of 
disasters. As time has gone on more information can be found about what causes 
natural hazards. This information can then be used to help cities prepare for natural 
hazards so that the effects will be lessened. Therefore to reduce the risk from natural 
hazards mitigation measures can be employed.  Often the best time to accomplish this 
is during the window of opportunity which exists after one disaster and before the 
next.   
The majority of cities around the world were founded before there was any knowledge 
of how natural disasters like earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanoes occur. However, 
historically, some communities have been located to reduce risks, for example Italian 
hill towns were located on high ground to avoid flooding and diseases such as malaria 
which were widespread on valley floors (Burby, 2004).   
Disasters disrupt communities by interrupting day to day life and damage the 
infrastructure and services that communities rely on to function.  
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Figure 1 Components of a community (MCDEM, 2005)  
Communities are composed of 4 environments: Social, Built, Natural and Economic 
(see Figure 1). All of these environments will be affected differently by a disaster and 
this will affect how they interact with other environments. Recovery from a disaster is 
therefore complex and needs to involve communication and coordination between 
these different components (MCDEM, 2005).  
Review of Literature
Recovery  
Recovery is defined as ‘the coordinated efforts and processes to effect the immediate, 
medium and long term holistic regeneration of a community following a disaster’ 
(MCDEM, 2005). Therefore the concept of recovery combines Reconstruction, 
(rebuilding of buildings and infrastructure), Restoration, (pre-impact physical and 
social patterns) and Rehabilitation, (restoration of physical and social patterns to a 
higher level) (Quarantelli, 1999).    
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Limited thought was given to the concept of recovery before the 1970s however 
studies in recovery have increased since the 1980s (Becker et al, 2006; Quarantelli, 
1999). Haas et al (1977) divided the concept of recovery into 4 major phases: 
1. Emergency Period 
2. Restoration Period 
3. Replacement Reconstruction Period 
4. Commemorative, Betterment or Developmental Reconstruction Period  
These four phases are shown in Figure 2 below. The phases have overlap periods as 
one phase begins to change into another. The length of each phase, except for the last 
is roughly ten times as long as the previous (Vale and Campanella, 2005; Haas et al, 
1977). The emergency period is categorised by loss of life, searching and caring for 
the injured and the beginnings of debris clearing. The end of this phase is usually 
signalled by the cessation of search and rescue efforts, reopening of main streets and a 
reduction in emergency housing and feeding.   
Restoration, the second phase, is where the key urban services are re-established, 
displaced people return and debris is cleared. Depending on the resources available 
this phase may last from a few months to more than a year. The third phase, 
replacement reconstruction phase, consists of rebuilding capital stock to pre-disaster 
levels and the return of the population. Where a high death toll has been experienced 
this usually means the area once again contains adequate housing, jobs and amenities 
to support the pre-disaster population (Vale and Campanella, 2005). As this activity 
occurs economic and social activity will return to pre disaster levels. The final stage 
of recovery is the commemorative, betterment and development reconstruction phase. 
This often involves large development projects which serve three varied but often 
interconnected functions, to memorialise the disaster, mark the cities post disaster 
improvement or to serve the future growth and development of the community (Vale 
and Campanella, 2005).  
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Figure 2 Model of Disaster Recovery (Redrawn by Vale and Campanella, 2005 from Haas et al, 
1977)  
These phases have been simplified into two phases by Schwab et al (1998): 
a) Short term recovery- restoration of services but no major reconstruction works 
b) Long-term recovery- returning community to conditions that existed prior to 
the event while taking opportunity to focus on mitigation measures   
The time taken for a community to recover will vary according to the magnitude of 
damage and loss; however recovery will follow a similar pattern (Haas et al, 1977).  
However the model shown in Figure 2 shows the recovery as a whole and does not 
show uncompleted recovery which may occur in certain groups throughout a 
community as they may not be able to recover at the same rate as others. Therefore 
while recovery may follow this pattern of recovery the variations that occur during the 
recovery are of interest to see what causes and what changes these variations (Vale 
and Campanella, 2005).  
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Resilience and Vulnerability  
Resilience is seen as contributing to sustainability and reducing vulnerability (Klein et 
al, 2003) therefore resilience to natural hazards is the ability of a person or group to 
cope with or adapt to stress caused by natural hazards (Blaikie et al, 1994). Other 
definitions of resilience note that the system will return to its original state (Klein et 
al, 2003) however this is not ideal for an urban environment at risk to natural hazards 
as the risk will always remain the same if it returns to its original state. Resilient and 
therefore sustainable communities are defined as societies which are organised to 
minimise the effects of disasters, and, at the same time have the ability to recover 
quickly by resorting the social and economic vitality of the community (Tobin, 1999). 
It seems that resilience may take time to acquire, depending on certain circumstances 
when a disaster occurs. As knowledge of disasters, planning and engineering 
techniques develop so will resilience. Therefore a city will develop resilience 
gradually over time. In this way resilience can be compared to urban regentrification 
as the vulnerable parts of a city are slowly renovated.   
Vulnerability is defined by Blaikie et al (1994) as the characteristics of a person or 
group that affect their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the 
impact of a natural hazard. Cross (2001) outlines that vulnerability is determined by 
physical and social exposure, disaster resilience, pre event mitigation or preparedness 
and post event response. Therefore reducing these vulnerabilities requires putting 
mechanisms in place combined with technology, expertise and other resources to 
complete the process of reducing vulnerability (Klein et al, 2003). Therefore 
resilience and vulnerability are closely connected.   
Anticipatory action, or the ability to plan, prepare and implement adaptive options, 
can help to prevent vulnerabilities (Burton et al 1993; Mitchell 1993; Godschalk et al 
1999; Pelling 2003 in Klein et al 2003) while resilience can be linked to planning and 
adapting to natural hazards (Dovers and Handmer, 1992 in Klein et al, 2003).  
The terminology in use has many subtle variations, as each have a slightly different 
focus. This may depend on the agency using the terms and their overall aims. This 
may produce significant problems with interorganisational understanding. 
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Pre event planning  
Disasters can produce major difficulties for local governments through failure in 
recovery leadership (Rubin, 1985 in Ying Wi and Lindell, 2004; Spangle Associates, 
1997), impromptu decision making (Rubin 1995) and poor interdepartmental co 
ordination (Rolfe and Britton, 1995 in Ying Wi and Lindell, 2004). A great deal of 
planning is focused on the emergency response (Haas et al, 1977) however, pre event 
planning is critical to achieve successful coordination among agencies ensuring a 
smooth transition between response and recovery activities (MCDEM, 2005)  
To reduce the problems that may often occur in a post disaster situation pre-event 
planning can be beneficial. Wilson (1991) argues that the preparation of pre-impact 
recovery plans provide locals officials with time to consider how the activities that 
take place during the immediate aftermath will affect long term recovery. Likewise, 
Geis (1996) and Haas et al (1977) propose that recovery issues resolved in advance, 
by means of disaster scenarios will increase the efficiency and quality of post-impact 
decision-making. 
Essential Components of Pre event recovery plans  
An efficient and effective recovery plan combines a number of elements which should 
work together to create a useable long term recovery plan (Rubin, 1985, in Ying Wi 
and Lindell, 2004). Personal leadership, the ability to act and knowledge of the 
actions to take are three necessary components of recovery. Wilson (1991) believes 
that recovery should be a continuing organisation wide process with the full support 
and involvement of top officials.   
Schwab et al (1998) highlights four sets of decisions which are important to address 
when planning:  
1) Sites for temporary housing, relocation of damaged businesses and 
dumping of debris 
2) Closure of roads and bridges 
3) Restoration or relocation of critical infrastructure 
4) Reconstruction or relocation of dwelling units 
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Additionally the plan should also evaluate the roles and responsibilities in recovery, 
and the potential sources of financial help (Mileti, 1999). Schwab et al (1998) and 
Mileti (1999) believe that post-disaster recovery plans will be most effective if 
prepared in accordance with these principles:  
o Consensus Building- avoiding conflict by involving the 
community in rebuilding decisions 
o Providing Information- about the hazard, exposed population, 
buildings and infrastructure and the resources available for 
recovery aid 
o Procedures – should stray as little as possible from pre disaster 
procedures 
o Planning Style-  should allow flexible and cooperative procedures 
to replace more formal rule orientated ones  
Overall a pre-event plan creates a vision for decision makers and a framework within 
which decisions will be made with general guidance and principles to follow (Schwab 
et al 1998) as well as incorporating mitigation programs to further reduce risks 
(Comerio, 1998 in Ying Wi and Lindell, 2004).  
Hazard Mitigation  
In the immediate aftermath of a disaster is a timeframe know as a ‘window of 
opportunity’ (Burby, 2004; Kingdom, 1995 in Ying Wi and Lindell, 2004).  This is 
the most appropriate time to make changes to improve resilience. However it is easy 
for these opportunities to be lost as decisions need to be made quickly, usually in an 
atmosphere of confusion and with pressure from governments and the public. Schwab 
et al (1998) believe that there is about a 1 month window of opportunity in which 
changes can be incorporated into plans. If decisions are rushed then vulnerability may 
be reproduced or hinder recovery (Schwab et al, 1998).This was the case in Sri Lanka 
after the Boxing Day tsunami where new land controls inhibited recovery and were 
later discarded (Ingram et al, 2006). Pre event planning means that the window of 
opportunity can be used to its fullest advantage of to its fullest as time is must not be 
wasted making decisions. 
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The best time to introduce hazard mitigation measures is during the window of 
opportunity. Hazard mitigation is the forward action that is taken to reduce or 
eliminate the long term risk to human life and property from natural hazards (Berke 
and Beatly, 1997; Godschalk et al., 1999 in Ying Wi and Lindell, 2004). Mitigation 
measures can be divided into 3 categories: 
o Community Protection Works- dams, levees drainage systems that 
provide protection to a specific area 
o Land Use Practices – zoning, planning to prevent development in 
hazardous areas 
o Building- Construction Practices- structural designs and materials that 
increase the resilience of structures in hazardous areas 
Recovery in a New Zealand Context  
Disaster management in New Zealand is governed by the 4 R’s concept, shown in 
Figure 3 (MCDEM, 2005). Reduction focuses on reducing risks of disasters, readiness 
concentrates on ensuring groups are prepared for the effects of a disaster, and 
response is planning for the initial response to a disaster and finally recovery focuses 
on restoring and improving the resilience of an affected community. Recovery in New 
Zealand from past events in New Zealand has often occurred haphazardly with the 
focus on restoring normal function as soon as possible (Becker et al, 2006).   
There is a high likelihood of experiencing an extreme disaster of some sort in New 
Zealand in the future due to the dynamic nature of the geological setting. Therefore 
planning and risk reduction are important concepts to understand.   
While pre-event planning is aimed at improving recovery, all of 4 R’s impact and 
affect recovery. Disaster mitigation is a part of risk reduction and a key component of 
pre-event planning. In New Zealand there is specific legislation designed to lessen the 
effects of a disaster, the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, the 
Resource Management Act 1991 and the Building Act 2004.   
The worst disaster to occur in New Zealand to date was the 1931 Napier earthquake. 
This disaster has the highest cost of lives and damage as it is the strongest earthquake 
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to effect a large population.  As this area was severely damaged it is the best place in 
New Zealand to look at how Napier recovered from the disaster. Therefore Napier is 
used as a case study of recovery in a New Zealand setting to formulate a pre-event 
recovery plan template appropriate to New Zealand.                      
Figure 3 The 4 R's of Disaster Management (MCDEM, 2005) 
Aim of Study
The aim of this study is to compare the recovery of Napier 1931 with examples of 
international recoveries to observe:  
o Was the recovery of Napier in 1931 successful?    
o Did recovery in 1931 improve resilience?   
o Would recovery now be similar to what happened in 1931?   
Using the case study of Napier a secondary aim is to study pre event recovery plans to 
see whether:   
o Pre-event recovery plans are helpful during recovery and  
o A recovery plan template could be constructed for a NZ setting.  
Reduction
Response
Recovery
Readiness
The 4 R’s 
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Research Method
International case studies were analysed to compare their recoveries. The New 
Zealand case study was analysed to understand how the recovery occurred in a New 
Zealand situation, differences between 1931 and today were considered. These 
examples of recovery were synthesised into a recovery plan template. 
International case studies 
International case studies were studied to see how recovery was approached and what 
problems occurred: so the progress of recovery can be analysed.  
Boxing Day Tsunami, 2004, Indian Ocean- This is used as a case study of recovery 
that is occurring presently and has been ongoing for the past two years; it allows 
different approaches to recovery to be observed through different countries affected. 
The tsunami was a relatively unexpected disaster to some countries such as Sri Lanka. 
There were no pre-event recovery plans prepared before the disaster, but a recovery 
plan was designed a few months after the tsunami.   
Hurricane Katrina, 2005 Gulf States USA- This recovery is also ongoing presently but 
it is at a different stage from the tsunami recovery. This recovery is also happening in 
a developed country which has similar legislation and social structures to New 
Zealand compared to the countries involved in the tsunami. Hurricanes are a yearly 
event in the Gulf States of the US. However the State of Louisiana and particularly 
the city of New Orleans are unprepared for these disasters. The hurricane is an 
example of an unsuccessful recovery when compared to the other 2 examples.    
Northridge Earthquake, 1994, California USA- This recovery was a success. It is also 
helpful to compare this disaster to Katrina, as both occurred in the same country. 
There are a few similarities between the two, but a major difference is the level of 
preparedness of the two regions. This disaster was different to the others studied as a 
recovery and reconstruction plan was prepared before the disaster occurred.  
These disasters are relevant to New Zealand as there are similarities and major 
differences in the social and economic situations; they are also useful comparisons to 
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each other for the same reasons. These disasters have also shown the way in which 
reduction, readiness and response may improve or impair recovery. 
New Zealand Case Study  
Napier Earthquake 1931- The Napier earthquake was chosen as the case study as it is 
New Zealand’s worst disaster. It caused the most damaged and claimed the most lives. 
There has not been such a large scale recovery since this event in New Zealand. 
However it is likely that an event of a similar scale could happen in any region of 
New Zealand from a number of processes.    
Field Work  
Fieldwork included a visit to Napier to conduct interviews and look at the recovery 
aspects of the town.  This included information from the Art Deco Trust and Museum.  
Interviews  
Nigel Simpson- CDEM Coordinator- Nigel is the Civil Defence coordinator for the 
Hawke’s Bay region. He was able to give information on likely scenarios for Napier 
and how Civil Defence is planning for recovery in this area. He also gave information 
on structure of a plan, and the important elements to communicate in the plan.   
Claire Hatfield- Policy Analyst, Napier City Council- Claire gave information on how 
new policies or changes in current policies could best be incorporated into current 
council plans and how cost and time would affect this.   
Elizabeth Lambert- Planning manager Hawke’s Bay Regional Council – gave 
additional information about how hazards are planned for by the Regional Council 
(especially coastal hazards).   
Tony McCleary, Tenancy Manager, Housing New Zealand – Tony outlined how 
welfare takes care of people after a major disaster. He discussed the options that are 
available for temporary accommodation for displaced people and the pros and cons of 
this kind of arrangement. State housing was also discussed.  
  
13
Clive Squires – Recovery Manager, Hawke’s Bay Civil Defence- Clive gave 
information on recovery plan details, on feasibility of some concepts.   
Hawke’s Bay Lifelines Group- Discussed how lifelines are prioritised and mitigation 
measures are incorporated, what groups are responsible for different lifelines repair, 
and the requirement for skilled workers from outside the effected area to repair 
lifelines which are highly technical.   
James Mineham- Planner Napier City Council- James answered questions about how 
recovery would fit into the district plan, how re-zoning of areas would take place and 
other changes that might be undertaken during recovery.  
Review of Legislation  
The current legislation that relates specifically to natural hazards and disasters in New 
Zealand was examined to see how recovery planning could fit into these existing 
frameworks. Legislation reviewed: 
o Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, 
o Resource Management Act 1991,  
o Local government Act 2002,  
o Building Act 2004, Historic Places Act 1993  
o Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987.  
Recovery Templates and Interdependency Matrixes   
Recovery planning templates were designed based on case studies, legislation and 
information obtained during interviews. Recovery templates were made using the 
Corel Draw 12 programme. They combine a pre-event plan with a post-event plan 
component.    
Interdependency matrixes were developed for each environment to show which 
agencies are dependant on others. A relative scale of 1-5 was used basing dependency  
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 on the amount of communication needed between agencies, with 1 being low level of 
communication and 5 being high level of communication.  
  
15
Chapter 2 - International Case Studies 
Introduction
Three international examples of recovery have been studied to isolate similarities and 
differences with the recovery of Napier in 1931. These examples are:  
Boxing Day Tsunami 2004- Sri Lanka and Indonesia 
Hurricane Katrina 2005- New Orleans 
Northridge Earthquake 1994- Los Angles area   
These case studies have been chosen for specific reasons. Firstly, to construct a 
recovery template for an all-hazards recovery approach. Therefore, different types of 
disasters were chosen. Earthquakes and tsunami are likely to occur in most areas of 
New Zealand. While New Zealand is not at risk from hurricanes it is at risk from 
meteorological disasters such as extreme wind gusts, surface flooding, snowfall and 
cyclones.  
Secondly, the Boxing Day Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina disasters are actively 
recovering at the time of writing. This gives the opportunity to see the problems 
which have occurred during the recovery, which in the case of these two disasters has 
occurred without pre-event recovery planning.   
Lastly, the Northridge earthquake is an example of a successful recovery with a pre-
event recovery plan. Two American disasters have been chosen to compare because 
their culture and systems are similar to New Zealand.      
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Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004  
On the 26 of December 2004, a ‘great’ earthquake (magnitude 9) occurred off the 
western coast of Northern Sumatra. The earthquake lasted for approximately 8 
minutes, during which time about 1 trillion tonnes of seawater was displaced causing 
a devastating tsunami (Ni et al. 2005, Lay et al. 2005 in Goff et al. 2006). The tsunami 
reached Sumatra a mere 15 minutes after the earthquake and continued to travel 
across the Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea and Indian Ocean, reaching the shores of 
East Africa 7 hours later (Goff et al, 2006).    
As a result of the tsunami, 285,000 people lost their lives, with countless others 
injured. The tsunami destroyed 400,000 homes. Other lifeline infrastructure was 
severely damaged including many coastal roads and railways. At least 1.4 million 
people lost their livelihoods, the majority of whom relied in some way on the fishing 
industry (United Nations, 2005; Oxfam International, 2006b).   
In addition to the 26 December earthquake and tsunami, another earthquake and 
tsunami occurred months later on the 28 March 2005. This time the damage was 
concentrated mainly on the coast of Nias, Sumatra. This tsunami left a further 1,000 
people dead and 70,000 displaced (United Nations, 2005; Oxfam International, 
2006b).   
Unlike the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean does not have a tsunami-warning centre. 
The earthquake that caused the tsunami was so great that it was not immediately 
known how big it was as the seismic instruments are not designed for such events. 
When it was known that the earthquake was large enough to have the potential to 
cause a tsunami it had already struck in some places, and the places it was heading for 
did not have the communication lines or plans in place to get messages out to people.   
The 2004 Asian Tsunami has been chosen as a case study for this study as the 
recovery phase is occurring currently. In addition, this disaster was underestimated in 
that an earthquake and tsunami of the size that occurred was completely unexpected. 
There was no planning for this event, as it was not considered as a likely disaster. The 
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worst effects areas were the region of Bandah Aceh, Indonesia, and the coastal areas 
of Sri Lanka and Thailand. Although affected, India declined foreign aid and indeed 
gave aid to Sri Lanka (FAO United Nations, 2005).  
Effects of the tsunami 
Sri Lanka
The tsunami struck the shores of Sri Lanka 2 hours after the earthquake with the 
second wave the biggest (James Lee Witt Associates, 2005). The largest tsunami 
wave height of 8.71m was recorded at Nonagama, while the greatest inundation 
distance of 390m and run up height of 12.50m occurred at Yala (Goff et al. 2006).   
Most Sri Lankans live on a narrow coastal plain less than 30m above sea level. 
Coastal features determined to an extent the damage suffered by the tsunami. The 
headlands blocked the tsunami inundation while the sandy bays focused the waves, 
which increased run up and inundation (Goff et al. 2006).   
Sri Lanka is situated in an intra plate setting and experiences little seismic action, 
therefore it is perceived that the country is not at a great risk from earthquakes and 
tsunamis. The most frequent natural hazards in Sri Lanka are cyclones. The first sign 
of the tsunami in Sri Lanka was a negative wave, where the water receded at least 1 
km in some places. This was then followed by two large positive waves (Goff et al, 
2006).   
The government struggled to respond effectively, having no formal incident command 
system. Within 3 days a Centre for National Operations was established under direct 
control from the prime minister to coordinate national and international relief 
operations (Yamada et al, 2006).   
Aid services were inundated with supplies from overseas. This caused a major 
problem for two reasons. There was very little in the way of warehousing and storage 
facilities to store the donation materials. This led to piles of donated clothing and 
other items being dumped in villages and temporary camps. Most of the donated items 
were completely unsuitable for a tropical environment. Directly after the tsunami 
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many displaced people were given tents, which were unbearable in the hot humid 
conditions and start to rot after a few days (Yamada et al, 2006). Many people 
donated clothing such as woollen jerseys and heavy winter jackets, which were not 
suitable for the climate. In addition, much of the clothing was inappropriate for the 
culture and religious beliefs of the area.   
The military assisted in the emergency phase by rescuing and transporting people, 
clearing debris and helping to restore vital services. Injured people were firstly 
transported to hospitals by helicopter. Ambulances from inland parts of Sri Lanka 
were sent to help transport people to hospitals further away from affected areas, as 
coastal hospitals were overwhelmed with injured.  
In Sri Lanka, deaths which occur outside the hospital require the bodies to be brought 
to the hospital for autopsies and forensic tests (Yamada et al, 2006). Hospital morgues 
usually have the capacity to deal with 5- 10 bodies at any time. Staff and patients left 
some hospitals as they became completely inundated with bodies. Identification of the 
deceased was extremely difficult as rapid decomposition occurred from bodies being 
in the water for long periods. Some bodies were finger printed and photographed, 
however it was impossible for this to be done for all. DNA Identification testing was 
not available so many bodies were buried in mass graves (Lessig et al, 2006).   
Language differences caused problems between international aid workers and locals. 
Only educated people in Sir Lanka speak English, most people affected by the 
tsunami did not speak English. Cultural differences were also significant, in addition 
to a lack of coordination between Non Government Organisations (NGO) and Sri 
Lankan health providers. This included duplication of some services and often a lack 
of records resulting in people receiving multiple or unnecessary vaccinations.  
Housing  
The tsunami destroyed or damaged 98,000 houses in Sri Lanka, which left 516,159 
people without homes (United Nations, 2005). Transitional shelters have been built by 
NGOs, the government and donor agencies under Task Force Relief to house the 
displaced population during rebuilding. Sri Lanka must now rebuild 100,000 houses. 
Approximately 65 percent of the houses are under construction and at least 5 percent 
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are finished. Three major factors are slowing the reconstruction of housing in Sri 
Lanka: 1) property issues, 2) lack of materials and skills and 3) Civil unrest (United 
Nations, 2005; Oxfam International, 2006a).   
Days after the tsunami the Sri Lankan government implemented a policy which 
prevented people rebuilding within 32-200m of the ocean; 32,000 of the damaged 
houses fall within this coastal buffer zone (Ingram et al, 2006). Many people who 
depend on the ocean for their livelihoods are in temporary housing camps long 
distances from the ocean. A significant number of these people lived in poverty with 
poorly constructed housing and without land titles. Those who did have land titles or 
may now be able to inherit property may no longer have any documentation to prove 
ownership rights. Those who are at particular risk of losing property from lack of 
documentation are widows and women. However, the government has now decided to 
rethink this buffer zone policy and at the time of writing a final decision has yet to be 
made (United Nations, 2005; Oxfam International, 2006a).   
Other issues with housing are the disparities between housing built by different NGOs 
(United Nations, 2005; Oxfam International, 2006a). This often leads to feelings of 
inequality amongst villages, and some areas are being rebuilt lacking infrastructure 
such as sanitation and road access. However, this is also a result of unclear building 
policies and often a lack of adherence to pre-disaster building regulations. In addition, 
there has been a lack of consultation with local villagers about reconstruction plans. 
These factors, and others, have led to a resurgence of activity by the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) mainly in the north and east. This has slowed reconstruction 
even further by displacing tsunami victims in the LTTE controlled areas due to 
violence and lack of supplies allowed in or out of these areas. Shells have hit some 
rebuilt houses during the conflict.   
The other problem with rebuilding is getting resources and labour to build so many 
desperately needed homes. Care needs to be taken that resources are not taken to 
rebuild at a cost to the environment. Resources such as sand for concrete, timber for 
construction and additional building materials are hard to acquire (Ingram et al, 2006). 
It is important to make sure that any timber that is used in reconstruction has come 
from a sustainable forestry practice. These problems have led to many of the materials 
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being imported. However, a shortage of warehouse and storage facilities and 
accessibility to damaged areas is still a problem adding delays to construction. Skilled 
labour is also a problem. Some people who have lost their livelihoods have begun to 
build as an alternative source of income; however some are poorly (if at all) trained 
leading to some construction work of poor quality (Ingram et al, 2006).   
The sheer scale of the reconstruction needed to all areas of the community is 
extremely daunting to a country with no formal emergency management structures in 
place.  
Livelihoods 
Approximately 150,000 Sri Lankans lost their source of income in the few minutes it 
took for the tsunami to occur (United Nations, 2006). Fifty percent of these people 
were involved in the fishing industry, four to five percent in the agriculture industry, 
and the remaining forty five percent were in tourism, small business, the public sector 
or self-employment.  
Since the tsunami, many NGOs have donated fishing boats and nets to fishermen who 
lost their equipment. However, this has led to problems. Directly after the tsunami a 
fear of the ocean and a reluctance to catch and eat fish because of the belief that they 
may have been feeding on corpses prevented a speedy re-establishment of the fishing 
industry (Yamada et al, 2006). A lack of consultation between fishermen and NGOs 
meant that fishermen who needed boats that could stay at sea for weeks received boats 
that were only suitable for day fishing (Yamada et al, 2006; United Nations, 2006).   
A ‘culture of dependency’ arose in some of the temporary camps. After receiving a 
monthly stipend of 5000 rupees and basic rations of rice, dhal, sugar and coconut milk 
many people came to expect this aid and were not motivated to recover their own 
livelihoods (Yamada et al, 2006). Cash for work schemes were often poorly attended 
and in some camps fisherman refused to return to the ocean. Some fishermen have 
begun to act as middlemen contracting other men to catch fish for them with the boats 
and nets they received from NGOs and they take a large proportion of the fish caught.   
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People living in rural coastal areas are particularly vulnerable as they rely heavily on 
natural resources to generate income (Pomeroy et al, 2006). To try to reduce some of 
that vulnerability NGOs are trying to encourage more diversity in livelihoods. This 
includes catching different fish species, or growing a variety of plants. This also 
depends on the diversity of the families’ income. Therefore, employment 
opportunities for women have become increasingly important in the post tsunami 
environment. These jobs include craft making, basket weaving and sewing, 
agricultural work or fish processing (Yamada et al, 2006; Oxfam International, 
2006b).  
Social and Community Recovery 
In Sri Lanka there has been a noticeable lack of communication between government 
departments, local people and NGOs, especially concerning land use policies and 
property rights. This has led to recovery of homes and villages being slow and patchy. 
Recovery of livelihoods has made progress, however there are still many people living 
in temporary camps.   
Services such as health and education were severely affected by the tsunami (Yamada 
et al, 2006, United Nations, 2006, Oxfam International, 2006a; Oxfam International, 
2006b; Ingram et al, 2006, Fritz Institute, 2005). Nearly 100 health centres and 
hospitals were destroyed and 182 schools were destroyed or damaged. Reconstruction 
of these facilities is under way, with temporary services being set up in temporary 
camps. The government has an agreement with 30 major international donors to 
rebuild all damaged schools. Psychological services have been set up in these 
temporary schools to help children and the return to school of children is 95 percent. 
Medical schools are training graduates in counselling services and sending them out 
to affected areas to provide support. There has been a severe increase in substance 
abuse in many villages since the tsunami as a consequence of the traumatic 
experience.  
Environmental Recovery 
A major environmental problem is how to deal with the debris from the tsunami. 
Debris was carried hundreds of metres inland by the waves. This debris includes 
boats, trucks, cars, trees and a variety building materials (Ingram et al, 2006). The 
beaches in areas were cleared within a few days of the tsunami, however in many 
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cases the debris was left piled inland away from beaches or dumped in drains. Much 
of the debris was deposited on agricultural land, which is now unusable. The other 
waste management problem is the amount of plastic material used during the relief 
and recovery phase. Careful planning is required for the management of this waste 
and other waste generated during the recovery process (Shaw, 2006).   
Water logging of agricultural land is also a significant problem. Areas of agricultural 
land will take months to recover from ponding of salt water (FAO United Nations, 
2005). Many of the fruit trees grown in these areas will take another 4 or 5 years 
before they will bear fruit. Some areas are becoming water logged at high tide when 
they did not before the tsunami as a result of subsidence of the land   
Many coastal environmental problems do not have quick or easy solutions (Oxfam 
International, 2006b).  It is clear that natural coastal barriers such as sand dunes, coral 
reefs and mangroves protected many areas from the worst of the tsunami. The beach 
systems need to be rehabilitated to provide ongoing protection from the ocean, 
particularly the parts of Sri Lanka that had coastal erosion problems before the 
tsunami. NGOs have taken measures to help protect the beaches by replanting 
mangroves and constructing sand dunes, some of which had been lowered to give 
hotels better views  
Indonesia
The tsunami arrived in the Indonesian province of Aceh 15 minutes after the 
earthquake (United Nations, 2005). As of April 2005, 128,715 were confirmed dead 
with thousands still missing. The damage is estimated at approximately $4.5 billion, 
which is nearly equal to the regions gross domestic product (GDP) (James Lee Witt 
Associates, 2005; United Nations, 2005). As Indonesia is close to the epicentre, many 
buildings were severely damaged by the earthquake as shown below in Figure 4. 
People were helping those hurt by the earthquake when the tsunami struck. In the 
aftermath, engineers and doctors volunteered their services and unaffected 
Indonesians donated money for food, water and shelter. The Indonesian Government 
introduced its official Reconstruction plan in March 2005 (James Lee Witt Associates, 
2005).  
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Figure 4 Destruction in residential Banda Aceh from the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami (Steinbeck, 
2007) 
Housing 
The major problem with rebuilding housing in the province of Aceh is conflict over 
property rights (Oxfam International, 2006b). Three kinds of law regarding property 
rights are prevalent in Aceh. These are Adat - the local and traditional laws and social 
codes and the state laws passed by the Indonesian government. Aceh is an Islamic 
province so the Islamic law Shari’a applies to inheritance and guardianship matters. 
Seventy five percent of land ownership in Aceh is under Adat law.   
The tsunami left 600,000 people homeless and over 141,000 houses destroyed. At this 
time (end of 2006), 48,000 houses have been rebuilt. Recovery has slowed because of 
contested land rights (Oxfam International, 2006b). Trees, fences or other landmarks 
marking the boundaries of properties have been wiped out by the waves. Local 
officials have conducted meetings with locals and created maps with new boundaries. 
The officials and local people sign the map to say it is correct. Then the land is 
surveyed and land titles drawn up (James Lee Witt Associates, 2005).   
As many as 2,500 people need to be relocated to new land as their land either has 
been submerged or is unsafe(Oxfam International, 2006; Steinbeck, 2007). The 
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Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias (BRR) is purchasing 
new land for these people; so far $7.7 million has been spent on 700 hectares of land. 
This process is slow as it can take up to six months to buy land in Indonesia. Then, 
because of the high water table, the land needs to be prepared for building. This 
process adds time and money to relocating people.   
Inheritance claims under local and Islamic law have also lengthened the 
reconstruction process. People have been afraid to start rebuilding when they are 
uncertain of ownership of the land. These laws allow women and orphans to inherit 
property and measures are being taken to ensure that they are not overlooked during 
inheritance claim processes (James Lee Witt Associates, 2005).  
Livelihoods  
Many NGOs have facilitated training programs for displaced people who have lost 
their livelihoods. These training programmes are also important ways of diversifying 
income so that people’s livelihoods are more sustainable. Skills that have been taught 
range from building and construction work to help with the shortage of skilled 
workers for rebuilding, to handicraft and sewing, rubber nursery  and cocoa 
cultivation skills, to cake making. This addresses both men and women’s needs, as 
many women are now the heads of households (James Lee Witt Associates, 2005; 
Oxfam International, 2006).   
New docking facilities have been built to allow safe entry and exit to the ocean. The 
docks also provide places to buy and sell fish, cocoa and other commodities. As in 
other areas where fishermen have been affected by loss of equipment, NGOs have 
replaced boats and nets so fishermen may start earning again (Oxfam International, 
2006a).   
For those still unemployed cash for work, schemes have been implemented and 
employed 120,000 people. Two thirds of farmers have returned to their farms. 
Businesses are restarting through grants or microfinance (Oxfam International, 
2006a).  
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Social and Community Recovery 
Schools were severely damaged by the tsunami. Twenty-eight schools have been 
rebuilt with another 14 nearing the stages of completion (Oxfam International, 2006). 
Approximately 2000 teachers were killed by the tsunami so there has been a huge 
effort to retrain staff). Training has been completed by at least 111 teachers, with 28 
teachers (one for each open school) trained in trauma counselling to help children 
having trouble dealing with the effects of the tsunami(United Nations, 2005, Oxfam 
International, 2006a).   
New policies have been developed to regulate and standardise housing, resettlement 
and social assistance (Oxfam International, 2006). New community centres have been 
rebuilt along with reconstruction of essential services. Roads and bridges have been 
repaired to a better standard than before the tsunami .Most main highways are fully 
repaired however, secondary arterials roads now need to be repaired. Water storage 
filtration and delivery systems have been put in place to ensure all people have access 
to clear water (United Nations, 2005)  
During the tsunami, 122 hospitals and health centres were damaged or destroyed. 
Thirty-eight of these care facilities are now fully functioning and a further 51 are 
under construction. Many health workers were also killed by the tsunami so there has 
been retraining of 2,500 people to staff these new centres (United Nations, 2005).   
People in each village are getting to have input into the recovery process, which is 
important for the community dynamic. This has changed greatly after the tsunami as 
more women that men died. Social networks have been disrupted as some community 
leaders died in the tsunami. Community consultation in the recovery process helps to 
repair social networks (Fritz Institute, 2005).  
Environmental Recovery 
Some debris from the tsunami has been recycled for used in new buildings to try to 
alleviate some of the strain on construction materials (Oxfam International, 2006b). 
Remediation of farmland effected by saltwater and mud from the tsunami is 
occurring. Green Coast, a program working in partnership with Wetlands 
International is working to rehabilitate coastal ecosystems. Over 600 hectares will be 
  
26
rehabilitated with coastal vegetation including mangrove swamps. Rehabilitation of 
40 hectares of coral reefs has already begun.  
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Hurricane Katrina
Background 
The Atlantic Hurricane season begins on 1 June and typically lasts until the end of 
November each year. Hurricanes form over warm oceans (>26 °C), the warm water 
heats the air and causes an area of low pressure to form. As the hurricane grows, it 
will develop stronger and stronger winds while the pressure continues to decrease. 
Since hurricanes rely on warm ocean water for strength a hurricane will weaken over 
land or cooler water. Storm surge, often the most dangerous factor of a hurricane 
develops due to the drag (friction) of the strong winds on the ocean water and the 
bathymetry of the coastline, causing a sudden rise in sea level (Simpson (Ed), 2003). 
Hurricanes are measured on the Saffir Simpson Scale shown in Table 1, with a 
category 1 hurricane being the weakest.   
Table 1 Saffir Simpson Scale (Elsner and Kara, 1999)  
The Gulf coast is particularly vulnerable to hurricanes; each summer the water warms 
enough for hurricanes to develop. Over the last 30 years, there has been considerable 
development along this area of coastline. Located in this area are important economic 
industries such as oil exploration, involving infrastructure for exporting resources. As 
a result of development, natural coastal barriers such as wetlands are disappearing at a 
rate of 25,000 acres per year; since  it is estimated that 2.7 miles of wetlands can hold 
back 1 foot of storm surge, this represents a significant increase in vulnerability.    
Category Damage Pressure (mb) Maximum 
Sustained wind 
speed (m s¯?¹ ) 
Peak Wind 
Gusts (m s¯?¹ ) 
Storm Surge 
(m) 
1 Minimal > 980 33-42 41-53 1 
2 Moderate 980-965 42-50 53-62 2 
3 Extensive 964-945 50-58 62-72 3 
4 Extreme 944-920 58-69 72-86 4-5 
5 Catastrophic <920 >69 > 86 >5 
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Sieur de Bienville, a French-Canadian noble man who believed the Mississppi River 
was in need of an ocean port, founded New Orleans in 1718. He chose the site of the 
current city on a curve of the river about 10 feet above sea level. The city was named 
after Philippe II the Duke of Orleans. When the site flooded in 1718 levees started to 
be constructed to prevent flooding. From then onwards till the present day the levees 
have been breached and repaired a number of times. In 1849 a levee was breached and 
floodwater stayed in the town for 6 weeks. Flooding in 1927 caused city officials to 
blow up the Caernarvon levee, which flooded a poor black neighbour to ‘save’ the rest 
of the city. In Hurricane Katrina 2005, the “fifty year” levees (which were the result 
of piecemeal repair jobs, outdated engineering and suspect construction techniques) 
failed, flooding 80% of New Orleans (Campanella, 2007).               
Figure 5 New Orleans showing levees and breaches during Hurricane Katrina, 2005 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4217212stm, 2005)  
The city is protected from flooding by a series of levees along Lake Pontchartrain and 
the Mississippi River as shown in Figure 5. The Army Corps of Engineers has been 
constructing the levees since the 1800s. However, the area on which New Orleans is 
situated is slowly sinking, so a large proportion of the city is below sea level, creating 
a bowl effect. The levees stop water flowing into the city; however if the city becomes 
flooded the water will not drain away and needs to be pumped out (Campanella, 
2002).   
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New Orleans has experienced three close calls in the last century from Hurricanes. 
Hurricane Camille in 1969 made landfall as a Category 5 storm killing 225 people and 
injuring 8,900.   
The Event
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) predicted the hurricane 
season of 2005 to be an active season with projections for 12 – 15 storms with 7-9 
becoming hurricanes. By August, this projection had been revised with additional 11-
14 storms, 7-9 of those becoming hurricanes, including 3-5 major hurricanes.  
August 23: Tropical Depression 12 formed over the Bahamas. 
August 24: the depression had strengthened to a tropical storm and was named 
Katrina. 
August 25: Tropical Storm Katrina was upgraded to a Category 1 Hurricane on 
August 25(Department of Homeland Security, 2006). At 6:30 pm Katrina made 
landfall in South Florida with sustained winds of 80 mph. Twelve people were killed 
and at least $ 2 billion in damage caused by the hurricane. The Gulf States began 
hurricane preparations. Katrina was predicted by the National Weather Service 
(NWS) to make landfall on North Gulf States. Emergency Operations Centres were 
activated.  Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) pre-staged 400 
truckloads of ice, 500 truckloads of water and 200 truckloads of food at logistic 
centres in Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, Texas and South Carolina. FEMA also 
placed Emergency Response Teams on alert.  
August 26: Katrina moved west of the gulf and strengthened to a Category 2 
hurricane on August 26(Department of Homeland Security, 2006). The National 
Hurricane Centre (NHC) released a tracking forecast projecting the eye of the storm 
would pass over New Orleans on August 29 as a Category 4 or 5 hurricane with a 
possible storm surge of 15-20 feet. The state Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi 
declared a state of emergency and put response plans into action. Emergency 
Operation Centres were put on the highest level of alert.  
August 27: On August 27, Katrina strengthened again, this time to a Category 3 
hurricane and almost doubled in size (Department of Homeland Security., 2006). 
Louisiana began implementing Phase 1 of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan 
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including contra flow plans on major highways. Four churches in the area were 
involved in the pilot scheme ‘Operation Brothers Keepers’ which helped evacuate 
people without their own transport. It was estimated that at least 100,000 people in 
New Orleans did not have their own transport, posing an evacuation problem.   
New Orleans declared a state of emergency, and advised residents to voluntarily 
evacuate and store up on non-perishable food and bottled water.  
 FEMA moved to the highest alert level and continued to pre- stage supplies.  
August 28: President Bush declared states of emergency in Mississippi, Louisiana 
and Alabama on August 28 (Department of Homeland Security, 2006). This action 
authorized federal spending to assist the state and local governments in making 
provisions to save lives and property.   
Katrina strengthened to a Category 5 Hurricane. The NHC advised that the levees in 
New Orleans could be overtopped by Katrina’s storm surge. They also noted that if 
these conditions occurred, New Orleans would be uninhabitable for weeks, with 
extreme water shortages. Weather warnings and forecasts increased. Mississippi and 
Alabama ordered evacuations of low-lying areas; President Bush ordered mandatory 
evacuations of New Orleans.   
At 5 pm contra flow evacuation was stopped and at 6:43 pm the airport was closed 
due to high winds (Department of Homeland Security, 2006; Brinkley, 2006). The 
Governor of Louisiana, Kathleen Blanco estimated that 92% of the population of New 
Orleans had been evacuated. The Superdome was opened as a shelter of last resort for 
general population with estimates of 10,000-12,000 people seeking shelter there. A 
request of 18,000 litres of water and 109,440 ready to eat meals was made to FEMA 
for the Superdome, however because of bad weather conditions only 90,000 litres of 
water and 43,776 ready to eat meals were supplied   
The Louisiana National Guard supplied 10,000 ready to eat meals and 13,000 bottles 
of water to the Superdome. There were also law enforcement officers and 71 medical 
personnel situated in the Superdome to help people seeking shelter there.  By sun 
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down on August 28 throughout the region there were pre-staged over 3.7 million litres 
of water, 4.6 million pounds of ice, 1.86 million ready to eat meals, in addition to 
another 2.1 million ready to eat meals located at nearby emergency operation centres 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2006).   
On the evening of the 28th rain began to fall with high winds and hail.   
August 29: Hurricane Katrina Makes Landfall
Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 hurricane at 6:10 am August 29 in 
Plaquemine Parish, Louisiana (see Figure 6).          
Figure 6 Satellite Image of Hurricane Katrina as a Category 3 storm making landfall, Monday 29 
August (Brinkley, 2006)  
It continued to move north with sustained winds of 115 mph and gusts of up to 130 
mph. By 1:00 pm, Katrina was downgraded to a Category 1 hurricane. Reports of 
storm surge were estimated to be at least 27 feet in Louisiana (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2006; Natural Hazards Centre, 2006).  
The Response
At 9:12am August 29 NWS reported that the levees of New Orleans had been 
breached. However, because all lines of communication were down reports varied and 
people interchanged overtopped and breached, adding to the confusion. Homeland 
Security reported at 6:00 pm August 29 that pending an assessment no levees had 
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been breached. At this stage, 80% of New Orleans was flooded to height of 20 feet 
(Department of Homeland Security., 2006; Brinkley, 2006).   
The Mayor of New Orleans, Ray Nagin, took shelter in a New Orleans hotel, however 
the hotel lost all communications and he was trapped there for 2 days without being 
able to give any orders regarding response and rescue (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2006). 
August 30: Conditions in New Orleans continued to worsen because of the flooding, 
this sparked officials to organise a mass evacuation of the city. However, there was no 
post-landfall evacuation plan, so state and local government officials worked closely 
with the Department of Defence and the Department of Transportation through FEMA 
to conduct evacuations (Department of Homeland Security, 2006). Some people 
rescued from their homes were left on dry roads for days until evacuated as shown in  
Figure 7.              
Figure 7 Survivors of Katrina stranded on an elevated section of Interstate 10 on August 31st 
(Brinkley, 2006)  
During this time, many police officers abandoned their positions, two police officers 
committed suicide. Approximately 133 New Orleans Police officers either resigned or 
were let go as a result of Hurricane Katrina.  People began looting mainly for food 
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and water; nevertheless there are reports of people taking electronic equipment. 
However some of these stories are unfounded (Department of Homeland Security, 
2006; Brinkley, 2006; Natural Hazards Centre, 2006).   
People who were not at the Superdome began to make their way there or to the 
convention centre. The latter was not designated as a shelter and no supplies had been 
pre-staged there, however people presumed that a large public building on high 
ground would be a shelter (Department of Homeland Security, 2006).   
Many deaths occurred as a result of Katrina, many of these people were elderly and 
sick. Reports of hospitals and rest homes full of decaying corpses are common. The 
majority of these people died as a result of extreme dehydration. Others drowned as 
the levees burst, as most facilities were completely empty the corpses stayed where 
they were. Bodies found floating in the flood waters were tied to structures until there 
were the facilities to be able to deal with them (Department of Homeland Security, 
2006; Brinkley, 2006; Natural Hazards Centre, 2006).   
The Army Corps of Engineers spent 53 days pumping approximately 250 billion 
gallons of water from New Orleans (Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 
2006; Department of Homeland Security, 2006; Brinkley, 2006; Natural Hazards 
Centre, 2006). 
The Recovery
Six Months After  
Housing  
o Six months after the hurricane recovery in the region had begun. Meeting long 
term housing needs for displaced people has proved a major challenge. All 
housing recovery is coordinated by the U.S Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) (Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast 
Rebuilding, 2006a).   
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o 18 months of housing assistance has been administered by HUD to 15,000 
HUD assisted or homeless families. HUD is repairing 6,000 of its damaged 
homes in the disaster area, and 1,000 people have already moved back in. 
Once repaired, the remainder of these houses will be offered to displaced 
people as temporary shelter or for purchase at a discounted price.   
o HUD has begun a Mortgage Assistance Initiative for people unable to pay 
mortgage repayments due to damage or repairs and loss of income caused by 
Hurricane Katrina   
o The Universities Rebuilding America Partnership program has been initiated 
by HUD. This involves getting skilled university students to help rebuild 
devastated communities.  
o Measures are being taken by other governmental agencies to ensure that 
housing is allocated to those in need with out discrimination.   
Economy 
o The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) is assisting rural families with 
funds to repair and rebuild damaged buildings.  USDA is making $1.2 billion 
available for emergency assistance for farmers (Office of the Federal 
Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 2006a).   
o The Department of Commerce (DOC) has created the Hurricane Contracting 
Information Centre that will provide a point of reference for minority- or 
women-owned businesses to register for Federal contracting opportunities. 
DOC is also helping rebuild businesses including technical assistance, 
development of long-term recovery strategies and business counselling 
services.  
o  Emergency grants of $2.3 million have been awarded through the U.S 
Department of Labour (DOL) across 11 states to help people whose source of 
income was impacted from the hurricane. The DOL has allocated $12 million 
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to train workers for jobs in critical industries such as, construction, energy, 
health care, transportation and safety/ security  
o  On December 21, 2005, the President finalised a law change, the Gulf 
Opportunity Zone Act. The purpose of this Act is to kick start the Gulf’s 
economy, by increasing business expensing including demolition and clean up 
and accelerating bonus depreciation. 
o The Internal Revenue Service has authorized certain extensions for tax returns 
and paying taxes, and other tax related activities for people affected by Katrina   
o Oil production in the Gulf of Mexico is running at 76% of pre-Katrina 
production while gas production has been restored to 85% of pre-Katrina 
production. Repair of oil pipelines has been ongoing.  
Environment and Levees  
o NOAA has collected 10,000 digital aerial photos for damage assessments and 
oil spill response prioritisation (Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf 
Coast Rebuilding, 2006a). They have assisted in cleaning up over 8 million 
gallons of spilled oil in the Gulf of Mexico. Their navigation Response Team, 
have been surveying the waterways looking for large debris, sunken ships and 
shoaling to ensure shipping lanes can be kept open and safe   
Community and Social 
o Repairs from the Department of Transportation (DOT) have reinstated basic 
transportation services, 44% of Louisiana’s highways have been repaired 
while 91% of Mississippi highways have been restored (Office of the Federal 
Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 2006a).   
o In New Orleans 13 bus routes have been restored. The Port of New Orleans is 
running at 100% of its pre- Katrina activity even though only 70% of facilities 
are operational and 85% of workers have returned. Gulfport (the worst hit 
port) is running at 50% of its pre-Katrina activity   
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o Energy companies have worked together to provide power to devastated areas 
and have discussed incorporating new technologies into the power system 
especially in New Orleans.   
o The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has allocated $550 
million for support to those without health insurance or adequate access to 
healthcare, and for health care providers. One floor of the Veterans 
Association nursing home has been reopened and there are temporary mobile 
clinics operating in the affected areas.   
One Year After 
Housing 
o One of HUD housing programs is Community Development Block Grants 
(CDBG), which is to help people rebuild damaged housing and infrastructure. 
As of August 9, 2006, over 100,000 homeowners have applied for assistance 
((Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 2006b); 
Department of Homeland Security, 2006; Allen, 2007)   
o Grants of up to $150,000 dollars are being given to residents whose houses 
were located outside pre-Katrina flood zones. Additional grants of $30,000 are 
available to help with costs of elevating houses to new hurricane safe building 
codes.   
o Mortgage relief foreclosure was extended to allow mortgagers to rebuild 
homes or preserve good credit by paying of mortgage.   
o FEMA and HUD have worked together to provide HUD houses which were 
previously off the housing market to be available for lease by displaced 
people. So far, 10,000 homes have been leased   
o The Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), which has been under HUD 
receivership since 2002, has organised 2,000 of its 7,000 housing units that 
were not damaged for lease by hurricane victims. HUD has also set up a 
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Disaster Voucher Program, which is aimed at helping people make the 
transition from FEMA housing to more semi- permanent or permanent 
housing   
o HUD has had to monitor rent prices in Louisiana through its Fair Rents 
Market. In New Orleans HUD has increased its Fair Markets Rents by 35%   
o Still ongoing is the Universities Rebuilding America Program, this program 
has been made possible with a partnership between HUD and the Corporation 
for National and Community Service  
o Home Depot and HUD have staged workshops for hurricane victims. The aim 
of these workshops is to increase hurricane preparedness and give advice on 
repairing houses.   
Economy 
o At this time, all ports are open with no restrictions. The Coast Guard are 
playing a major role in the recovery of shipping in the Gulf of Mexico (Office 
of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 2006b).  
o All petroleum refineries and crude and petroleum product pipelines affected 
by Katrina are back to normal operations.   
o The U.S Department of Agriculture (USDA) have set up special grants to help 
hurricane-affected farmers. This includes grants for increased feed costs for 
livestock, reimbursement for deceased stock, non-insured crop payments, 
debris clean up and replanting trees.  
o Other USDA programs included debris removal from farmland and nurseries, 
levelling land, replacing fencing and rebuilding farm structures such as 
chicken houses   
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o Over $10.3 billion, worth of disaster loans has been approved by the Small 
business administration for homeowners, renters and business owners affected 
by Katrina.   
o The U.S Department of Labour (DOL) has invested in four initiatives in the 
Gulf Coast region: National Emergency Grants ($195 million), Community-
Based Job Training Grants ($37 million), High Growth Job Training Initiative 
Grants ($12 million) and Pathways to Construction Employment Initiative 
Grants ($10 million).   
Environment and Levees 
o The NOAA has also helped in the recovery of the shipping industry by 
surveying shipping lanes for debris (sunken vessels, oilrigs and large debris) 
(Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 2006b).   
o FEMA has funded the removal of 100 million cubic yards of debris. At this 
stage, only 72% of debris removal in Louisiana is complete   
o The U.S Army Corps of Engineers have repaired 220 miles of floodwalls and 
levees since September 2005. The New Orleans hurricane protection system is 
in equal or better condition than its pre Katrina condition   
o The Army Corps is developing a plan to protect New Orleans from a Category 
5 hurricane by increasing the strength of the levee and flood wall system by 
changing the design of the walls and increasing the interior drainage capacity.   
o In several places, the levees have been armoured to protect against erosion, 
and pumping stations are being storm proofed.   
Social and Community 
o The rebuilding of public infrastructure such as schools, roads, water facilities 
and public buildings will be funded through a $5.5 billion grant from 
FEMA(Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 2006b). 
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o The U.S Department of Transportation (DOT) has allocated $2 billion dollars 
to repair and rebuild highway and bridges through the affect states. 
Additionally DOT is spending $62.2 million to rebuild airport infrastructure in 
Mississippi and Louisiana.   
o In Louisiana, power has been restored to all customers who can receive power 
safely. However, in New Orleans the Lower Ninth Ward and Lakeview are 
still without power.   
o The National Emergency Grants are being used to train and find jobs for 
20,000 workers. The Pathways to Construction program focuses on 
encouraging people to pave a career in construction   
o Federal services have been restored to affected regions including law 
enforcement and support for the space shuttle program (Office of the Federal 
Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 2006b)  
o Every hurricane-affected community has re opened at least one school. The 
Department of Education (ED) has made available $2 billion dollars to reopen 
schools, recover student records, replace lost materials and equipment, rent 
space for temporary school sites and helping to transport homeless students to 
school. All major universities and polytechnics have reopened   
o Work is being done by the U.S Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) to design a better health care system. Grants are being provided to pay 
for medical attention for displaced people without health insurance. The 
Veterans Association is replacing the New Orleans Medical Centre at a cost of 
$625 million.   
o The Department of Justice has assigned additional law enforcement officers to 
the New Orleans area to help combat crime. This includes lawyers, a Violent 
Crime Team and drug and forearm special agents  
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Eighteen Months After 
Housing 
o HANO is working hard to ensure that residents are aware of job opportunities 
and housing availability in New Orleans for when they return(Office of the 
Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 2007).   
o Four of the city’s largest housing projects which sat under several feet of water 
for days have been demolished and will be rebuilt with a focus on mixed- 
income housing.   
Economy  
o American taxpayers have committed more than $110 billion to help in the 
rebuilding of the hurricane affected states. The National Insurance Program 
has paid out to policyholders $16.1 billion in claims and has now closed 
almost all claims (Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast 
Rebuilding, 2007).  
Environment and Levees 
o Louisiana has promised to use the profits from drilling along the Outer 
Continental shelf to restore wetlands to add additional protection from future 
storms (Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 2007).   
o At this time, 82% of debris removal in the state of Louisiana is complete.    
o Congress has granted the Army Corps $6 billion to rebuild the New Orleans 
levee systems. Reparation work on the levees continued in the months 
following Katrina 7 days a week, 24 hours a day. Some delays have occurred 
in this work through environmental and contractual problems, however, an 
alternative plan to provide protection to city during the levee repairs was in 
place.   
o The Army Corps have taken responsibility for the failure of the levees during 
Hurricane Katrina. A report was commissioned to assess why the levees failed 
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pointed out that the levee system was inadequate and lacked a high degree of 
structural integrity. Figure 8 shows one of the breached levees being inspected 
by the US Army Corps.            
Figure 8 A member of US Army Corps inspecting 17th St Canal which was breached during 
Hurricane Katrina (Brinkley, 2005)  
Social and Community 
o FEMA’s Public Assistance program, which is designed to help communities 
rebuild public infrastructure, has donated $6.3 million to Louisiana for 
reconstruction (Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 
2007).  
o The most outstanding issues to still be resolved are the additional resources 
needed to fight crime, improve healthcare and strengthen the levees.  
Problems during Recovery 
Fraud and abuse of benefits is a major problem which is inhibiting the recovery of 
many of the areas in the gulf coast region (Department of Homeland Security, 2006). 
The Department of Justice has formed the Hurricane Katrina Fraud Taskforce. The 
aim of this taskforce is to deter, investigate and prosecute disaster related Federal 
crimes. So far, 6811 complaints have been received at the Baton Rogue office. Many 
contractors who have won contracts to rebuild parts of New Orleans have done 
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substandard jobs or have fraudulently taken money. Often this has been a product of 
paying workers low wages skimping on materials.   
One reason that people are only trickling back into New Orleans is that the health and 
school systems which were falling apart before the hurricane are taking a long time to 
recover. People who have moved may be unwilling to shift children from good 
schools and access to better healthcare to a substandard recovering educational and 
health care system (Natural Hazards Centre, 2006).   
Debris has been a huge problem during the recovery, especially mould and mildew 
that have grown in many areas after being submerged in water for weeks. A layer of 
sludge that washed over flooded areas from the floor of the lake has dried covering all 
flooded surfaces. This has been left up to residents to clear from their properties 
(Allen, 2007)  
Changes after Katrina
A report was commissioned by the President to review the Federal response to 
Hurricane Katrina. The report isolated recommendations for improving the Federal 
Governments response to future disaster. The Department of Homeland Security has 
led a series of hurricane exercises to increase official awareness and skills 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2006).  
A negative change as a result of Katrina is the way in which vulnerable populations 
may now view the government and city officials. It also shows a negative side of 
human nature as during this event and the recovery people were murdered, robbed, aid 
taken fraudulently, contractors paying workers low wages and fraudulently taking 
money from relief donations.   
Changes have been made to the National Response Plan to address inconsistencies in 
the plan and a quick reference guide has been developed to accompany this plan 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2006).  
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Changes to the levees and building codes particularly elevating low lying properties 
and the promise to increase wetlands are all good hazard mitigation strategies that 
have occurred as a result of the chaos of Katrina. Environmental awareness especially 
of the benefits of wetlands has also increased after this disaster.   
Northridge Earthquake 1994
The Northridge earthquake occurred at 4:31 am on Monday the 17th of January 1994; 
the shaking lasted for 15 seconds (Bolin and Sanford, 1998; Chang and Nojima., 
2001; Ying Wu and Lindell., 2004; Loukaitou-Sideris and Kamel, 2004; Klinger., 
2006; Trifunac and Tororovska, 2004). The M 6.7 earthquake occurred on an 
unknown blind thrust fault under Northridge in the San Fernando Valley, 30 miles 
north-west of central Los Angeles. Fifty seven deaths were caused by the earthquake, 
nearly half of these were earthquake induced heart attacks, 5,000 people were injured 
and 22,000 left homeless (Klinger. 2006). The relatively low number of deaths is 
attributed to the time of occurrence of the earthquake. Figure 9 shows the epicentre of 
the earthquake.  
Figure 9 Epicentre of Northridge Earthquake 1994 (Klinger, 2006) 
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The response to the Northridge earthquake was highly successful. The U.S 
government had been working on a Federal Response Plan for a number of years 
before the earthquake. The plan was designed to coordinate the disaster response 
activities of 26 federal agencies and the American Red Cross. The President declared 
for this plan to be used for the Northridge earthquake (Bolin and Sanford, 1998; Ying 
Wu and Lindell, 2004; Loukaitou-Sideris and Kamel, 2004).   
The earthquake caused landslides over a widespread area, seven major freeway 
sections collapsed and many houses were damaged. There was extensive damage to 
lifelines infrastructure. Natural gas pipelines broke, and electricity failed. In Santa 
Clarita and Simi Valley there was significant damage to water distribution and 
purification systems, as well as damage to above ground storage tanks (Bolin and 
Sanford, 1998; Chang and Nojima, 2001; Ying Wu and Lindell, 2004; Loukaitou-
Sideris and Kamel, 2004; Klinger, 2006; Trifunac and Tororovska, 2004 ).    
Many residential buildings were damaged. Apartment blocks suffered the most 
damage; seven times as many apartment units were damaged as individual. Many of 
these apartment blocks were low-income housing or were rented by young 
professionals (California Policy Research Centre, 2004). The Los Angles Department 
of Building Safety assigned red tags to destroyed buildings, yellow tags to seriously 
damaged buildings and green tags to undamaged or slightly damaged buildings (Bolin 
and Sanford, 1998; Chang and Nojima, 2001; Ying Wu and Lindell, 2004; Loukaitou-
Sideris and Kamel, 2004; Klinger, 2006; Trifunac and Tororovska, 2004).    
Other public buildings were damaged including 30 hospitals and 106 schools, large 
multi storey car parks built to the strictest building codes also collapsed (Klinger, 
2006). This leads to the conclusion that had the earthquake occurred during the day 
the death toll would have been considerably higher.  
Recovery
Earthquakes are not unexpected in California. The previous earthquake in California, 
Loma Prieta’ occurred in 1989 only 5 years before Northridge. However, the Loma 
Prieta earthquake did not have the best recovery in terms of rebuilding affordable 
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housing for low-income residents. Because of the frequency of earthquakes in the 
region, California has some of the strictest building codes in all of the United States 
(Bolin and Sanford, 1998; Chang and Nojima, 2001; Ying, Wu and Lindell, 2004; 
Loukaitou-Sideris and Kamel, 2004; Klinger, 2006; Trifunac and Tororovska, 2004).   
After Northridge, many of the current governmental systems used to deal with disaster 
recovery were inadequate. Consequently innovative social, organisational and 
economic programs developed. FEMA and the California Governor’s Office of 
Emergency Services worked hard to assist ethnic minorities affected by the 
earthquake, something, which had not occurred during the Loma Prieta earthquake. 
As a result, many projects went far beyond replacing the status quo (Bolin and 
Sanford, 1998; Ying, Wu and Lindell, 2004; Loukaitou-Sideris and Kamel, 2004).   
Social and Community  
Recovery of lifelines infrastructure occurred rather quickly. Electricity was restored to 
all regions within 24 hours of the earthquake. Water services were restored after a few 
days; however there were disruptions to supplies for up to 2 weeks in some areas 
while final repairs were made. Natural gas pipelines were finally restored 12 after the 
earthquake (California Policy Research Centre, 2004).   
Transportation was another matter altogether. Los Angles’ predominant type of 
transportation is private automobile. The earthquake damaged 286 state highway 
bridges, and seven major bridges collapsed. A detour was opened on the Interstate-5 
at the Gavin Canyon crossing on January 29 and the mainline road was reopened 4 
months later. At the Interstate 5 and State Route 14 interchanges, detours were 
constructed using truck bypasses. Two of the four damaged ramps were repaired in 
July and the remaining two repaired in November 1994. Nine miles of the State 
Route-118 were damaged; detours were implemented on local streets. Partial repair 
opened 5 miles in mid February and the remaining 4 miles were reopened in 
September. The Interstate-10 had 2 bridge collapses and local streets were again used 
as detours. The mainline was reopened in April (Chang and Nojima, 2001). The range 
of detours available showed the flexibility of the transportation system and allowed 
people commute to work and transport of goods during the highway reconstruction 
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(Bolin and Sanford, 1998; Chang and Nojima, 2001; Ying, Wu and Lindel., 2004; 
Loukaitou-Sideris and Kamel, 2004).   
Housing 
The damage to houses was widespread with high levels of damage concentrated in 
pockets (Loukaitou-Sideris and Kamel, 2004). Over 114,000 residential and 
commercial structures were damaged and $25 billion was used to rebuild and repair 
structures (Bolin and Stanford, 1997; California Policy Research Centre, 2004) More 
than 48,000 apartment units needed to be rebuilt or repaired. However many owners 
of apartment blocks had to apply for loans as a business which had high rates of 
interest or did not have insurance. The City of Los Angles Housing Department 
(LAHD) and HUD identified areas that had high percentages of damage, especially 
apartment blocks that owners were considering not rebuilding. They identified these 
areas as ghost towns. There were 17 ghost towns acknowledged, the classification of 
which was 100 units vacated and more than 60% of houses red tagged. The LAHD 
organised loans for property owners not insured and not entitled to other government 
benefits through the Community Development Block Grant program. The funds were 
used to rebuild and ensure the latest build standards were met. Twenty percent of all 
rebuilt rental units had to be affordable. By January 1996, 65% of ghost town units 
had loans and building repairs had begun.  Loan repayments were beginning and 
nearly all rebuilding finished by January 1999(Bolin and Sanford, 1998; Chang and 
Nojima, 2001; Ying, Wu and Lindell, 2004; Loukaitou-Sideris and Kamel, 2004; 
Klinger, 2006; Trifunac and Tororovska, 2004).   
Economy 
Under California law, local government officials can designate specific areas as 
redevelopment zones. Local government establishes redevelopment agencies to plan, 
finance and implement redevelopment strategies (Bolin and Stanford, 1998). 
Redevelopment agencies are eligible to receive grants from HUD to promote 
affordable housing. Before the Northridge earthquake Santa Clarita and Fillmore has 
redevelopment agencies in place.  The towns of Fillmore and Piru were concerned 
with historic preservation after the earthquake as there tons are used as early 20th 
century town movie sets which generates income for the towns. As this was important 
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for these towns the asked members of the movie industry to help in redesigning the 
town to make it even more appealing as a film set. While redevelopment agencies are 
not designed to specifically meet the needs of earthquake recovery they are often used 
by city officials to promote recovery while also promoting ongoing development both 
economically and socially (Bolin and Stanford, 1998).   
Planning and Policy 
In 1987, the City of Los Angles began to create a post- earthquake recovery and 
reconstruction plan for the city. The recovery and reconstruction plan has four key 
themes: planning, hazard mitigation, short term and long-term recovery. It assigns 
responsibility for 300 actions to departments or agencies within city government 
(Loukaitou-Sideris and Kamel, 2004).   
At the time of the Northridge earthquake, the plan was on the agenda of the 
Emergency Operations Board awaiting approval. The plan was approved for use 5 
days after the earthquake. Officials interviewed about using the recovery and 
reconstruction plan commented that they did not necessarily refer directly to the plan 
but that they knew what their responsibilities were and what needed to be done 
because of the planning process. They also found that many of the issues they may 
have encountered had been resolved during the planning stage also (Ying, Wu and 
Lindell, 2004).    
Overall, the recovery of the Northridge earthquake was successful. This is due to a 
combination of factors. Firstly, the earthquake occurred in a congressional election 
year; therefore, the situation received immediate political attention. This may partially 
explain the speed and large amounts of federal funding giving to victims of the quake. 
Secondly, the Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989 did not have an adequate recovery of 
housing units, especially for low-income earners. This problem was addressed during 
the Northridge earthquake by targeting ghost towns and encouraging them to be 
rebuilt (Bolin and Sanford, 1998; Ying Wu and Lindell, 2004; Loukaitou-Sideris and 
Kamel, 2004).   
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Another factor that contributed to the recovery was the redevelopment agencies that 
were present in many of the neighbourhoods before the earthquake and then 
incorporated recovery into their redevelopment plans. This ensured that recovery and 
development were occurring simultaneously, instead of development coming to a 
standstill during recovery. Recovery of housing after the earthquake was a complex 
programme. However, the recovery was made easier by using new and innovative 
funding schemes it help those who would have otherwise not received any.  
Discussion 
What is clear from studying these cases is that all aspects of disaster management are 
crucial to recovery. This is particularly evident in the recovery of New Orleans. The 
response to the hurricane was so appalling that it seems many have lost all trust in 
City Officials and are not prepared to move back to the city. This also means that 
people who do move back into the city may be there simply because they have no 
other choice. This may lead to frustrations and conflicts between these people and 
authorities during and after the recovery period.   
It is also interesting to compare Katrina and the Northridge earthquake. Earthquakes 
are a frequent event in California, as hurricanes are frequent on the gulf coast. What is 
strikingly obvious is the difference in readiness and disaster mitigation that has gone 
on between the two regions. California in the 1990’s was miles ahead of New Orleans 
in 2005 in terms of planning and risk reduction.   
Comparing Northridge and Katrina to the Boxing Day Tsunami is somewhat less 
obvious. However, the most noticeable difference is the way vulnerable populations 
have been treated between one of the richest countries and some of the poorest 
countries. In Sri Lanka and Indonesia, the tsunami recovery has brought peace to 
some areas but renewed war to others, vulnerable populations are being considered in 
rebuilding and receiving benefits. In New Orleans, there are still vulnerable groups 
who are not entitled to benefits, and 18 months after the disaster some poor areas are 
still without power. In Northridge, vulnerable populations were taken care of, 
ensuring they received benefits to allow them to rebuild.   
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In both Katrina and the Boxing Day Tsunami, it is clear that environmental recovery 
especially coastal rehabilitation is an important part of the reconstruction phase. It 
seems evident that this kind of environmental attention would not have occurred if it 
were not for a disaster of this scale.   
Sri Lanka’s and Indonesia’s property issues suggest that this could have been 
something that could have been avoided with prior planning. Sri Lanka would not 
have made a hasty decision to stop development close to the ocean only to revoke this 
after a few months, which delayed reconstruction. Surveying and official land 
ownership could have been an ongoing project in Indonesia, which would have speed 
up some rebuilding.   
These disasters parallel with Napier 1931 even though they occurred at different times 
and in different cultures. Clearing debris was a major problem in Napier just as it has 
been in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and New Orleans. Perhaps the most obvious similarity is 
the lack of housing especially for low income groups and the associated cost of 
rebuilding. Encouraging people back to Napier was not as much of a problem as it has 
been for New Orleans however this is perhaps more to do with the response to the 
disaster than just the recovery alone. The other major similarity is restarting the 
economy Napier has similarities to both the recovery of the tsunami and Katrina in 
this respect as the 1931 earthquake occurred in the depression. Although not 
commodity based New Zealand economy is agricultural based, with falling export 
prices during the depression this put a strain on the local economy where damage 
occurred to industry and farms. Diversifying income as has occurred in tsunami 
affected countries would increase the resilience of income for farming based families.  
Conclusions
Effective recovery is reliant on effective preparation, risk reduction and 
response.  
Northridge recovery was the most successful of the three examples followed 
by Boxing Day Tsunami. In these examples, there was a combination of prior 
planning, effective response and attention to vulnerable populations.  
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Where industry and development are of major concern it may take a disaster to 
realise that natural barriers are probably the most effective in terms of 
reducing disaster risk. 
Prior planning may help to solve issues that would otherwise draw out the 
recovery process e.g property rights  
Groups who should take responsibility for and plan for disaster may not do so 
effectively.  
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Chapter 3 - Case Study: Napier 1931 Earthquake  
Introduction
The city of Napier is situated in the Hawke’s Bay region on the east coast of the North 
Island, New Zealand. The Crown purchased the block of land which Napier occupies 
in 1851 (Conly, 1981). By 1854, the town had been planned and named Napier, after 
Sir Charles Napier a soldier who had fought in India. The streets were named after 
famous artists and literary figures. The development of Napier was confined to the hill 
known as Scinde Island and the port at Ahuriri. At this time, Napier consisted of hills 
surrounded almost entirely by water. Two single spits ran to the north and south of 
Scinde Island. As the town developed, a hill was levelled to create Clive and 
Memorial Squares. A severe earthquake hit the town in 1863, however damage was 
minimal as the town was still in the early stages of settlement. Another earthquake 
struck the town in 1931 and changed the topography and the development potential of 
the town dramatically (McGregor, 1989).  
Geological Setting
The Hikurangi Subduction Zone is located along the east coast of New Zealand as 
part of the Tonga- Kermadac Trench, where the Pacific plate subducts under the 
Australian plate (see   
Figure 10A). It is along this margin that the ocean-to-ocean subduction of the 
Kermadac trench makes the transition to strike slip and continental-continental crust 
collision in the South Island. The margin is approximately 500 km long, 480 km wide 
and accommodates the oblique motion between the Pacific and Australian plates. The 
convergence rate of the plates is about 50 mm per year (Hayward et al 2006).     
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Figure 10 (A) Map of Hawke's Bay Map of New Zealand showing location of Hawke's Bay 
in relation to the Hikurangi Subduction Zone on the Plate Boundary. (B) Map of Hawke's 
Bay region showing location of major active faults (Barnes et al, 2002) and dome of land 
uplifted during the 1931 earthquake (Hull, 1990a). (C) Pre-1931 Ahuriri Inlet and Post 1931 
estuary shown by dashed line ( in Hayward et al, 2006)   
Napier is situated in the forearc basin and prone to earthquakes and tsunami from the 
close proximity of the subduction zone. Volcanic ash is also a problem for the town as 
the associated subduction volcanism, the Taupo Volcanic Zone, lies west of Napier.        
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Hazards likely to affect Napier
Earthquake  
The Hawke’s Bay region is one of New Zealand’s most seismically active areas. This 
is due to the proximity of the Hikurangi Subduction Zone. About 160 km east of 
Napier the Pacific Plate begins to subduct obliquely under the Australian Plate. The 
Pacific Plate dips at an angle of 4-6° but steepens beneath Hawke’s Bay to around 25° 
(Hawke’s Bay Engineering Lifelines, 2001; Hayward et al, 2006).   
This subduction zone is unusual in two ways. Firstly, a larger proportion of the 
convergent margin is above sea level than in most subduction zones (Hawke’s Bay 
Engineering Lifelines, 2001). This could result in the effects of large earthquakes 
occurring closer to land than they usually would. Secondly, the oblique convergence 
of the two plates results in strike-slip faulting parallel to the coast. However, the 
motion perpendicular to the coast is largely unaccounted for. It is assumed that this 
motion is taken up by slip on the subduction interface and slip during thrust 
earthquakes on shallow faults between the Hikurangi trough and the axial mountain 
belt.   
Three types of earthquakes occur in the Hawke’s Bay region due to the stresses in 
each plate and at the interface of the plates (Hawke’s Bay Engineering Lifelines, 
2001).   
Type A earthquakes: These earthquakes occur in the over-riding Australian Plate 
caused by the transfer of stress from the coupling of the two plates at the subduction 
interface.  
Type B earthquakes: This kind of earthquake occurs at the interface between the 
subducting Pacific plate and the over-riding plate.   
Type C earthquakes: These earthquakes occur in the top part of the subducting Pacific 
Plate as it bends under the Australian Plate.   
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Of these three types of earthquake, type A and B are thought to cause the most 
damage. Type A may not be as large as Type B but Type A earthquakes may often be 
closer to the surface and population centres. Type B earthquake that occur on the 
subduction interface are generally larger as shown in (Hawke’s Bay Engineering 
Lifelines, 2001).                            
Figure 11 Subsidence and uplift associated with Napier 1931 earthquake. Elevation change in 
metres (Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifelines, 2001)  
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There are at least 22 known active faults in Hawke’s Bay. Two of these faults, the 
Ruahine and Mohaka faults, are northeast- trending strike-slip faults, and are 
segments of the Wellington Fault. The Napier- Hawke’s Bay Fault trends north-west 
and is thought to be the fault which ruptured in the 1931 earthquake, as the line of 
zero deformation traces the outline of this fault as shown in  
Figure 11 and   
Figure 10C. The 1931 earthquake was the first rupture on this fault for 1800 years 
(Hawke’s Bay Engineering Lifelines, 2001).  
The earthquake that is possibly of greatest risk to Hawke’s Bay is a large subduction 
earthquake (Type B earthquake). An M 7.7 earthquake with an average slip of 3m on 
the plate interface has been predicted for this region. This event has a recurrence 
interval of 550 years. Hayward et al (2006) show that subsidence is the overall trend 
in Hawke’s Bay; there have been at least 6 subsidence events in the last 7000 years, 
with a return period of 1000-1400 years in southern Hawke’s Bay. It is believed that 
these subsidence events (8.5 m total subsidence) are the result of subduction 
earthquakes while the 1931 earthquake which caused uplift (1-2m), is the result of a 
local fault in the crust of the over riding plate.   
Aside from damage caused by shaking, three other major effects could occur as the 
result of a large earthquake:  liquefaction, tsunami and either a landslide or a 
submarine landslide. Tsunami and landslides are discussed later in this chapter; 
liquefaction will be discussed here as it is solely related to earthquakes.   
Liquefaction occurs where sediments lose their ability to bear strength to due shaking. 
This is of particular concern when development occurs on unconsolidated or partially 
consolidated material. An earthquake needs to have shaking intensity of around MM 7 
for liquefaction to occur. Liquefaction can occur in two ways. Firstly, settlement may 
occur, where due to shaking, sediment compacts. This may cause a change in 
elevations, which has been estimated to be about 1m in Napier. Secondly, lateral 
spreading can occur and 15m of lateral spread has been estimated to occur during a 
large earthquake in Napier (Hawke’s Bay Engineering Lifelines, 2001).   
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Volcanic Ash  
The volcanoes of the central North Island are associated with the Hikurangi 
Subduction Zone. The Taupo Volcanic Zone (TVZ), one of the most active ryholite 
areas on earth, is the result of the melting of the down-going Pacific plate (Kissling 
and Weir, 2005; Smith et al, 2005). As the plate melts, magma is produced and the 
buoyancy of the magma compared to the surrounding rock causes it to rise to the 
surface creating a volcano.   
Because of the distance of the volcanoes from Napier, the city is not at risk from lava, 
pyroclastic flows or lahars. However the town of Napier is downwind of the 
volcanoes which means that it is prone to volcanic ash deposits which are carried by 
the prevailing winds south-east towards the city. This has occurred in the past, with at 
least three layers of rhyolitic tephra found in deposits around the area (Hayward, et al, 
2006). The last time ash affected Napier was the 1995-6 eruption of Mt Ruapehu in 
the TVZ (Hawke’s Bay Engineering Lifelines, 2001).   
The very fine nature of volcanic ash can cause major problems, by blocking filtration 
equipment, contaminating water supplies, causing respiratory problems, short 
circuiting electrical systems, causing damage by weighing structures down (especially 
if wet) and disrupting transport and communication systems, especially air transport 
(Hawke’s Bay Engineering  Lifelines, 2001) . Another problem with ash is the 
requirement to clean up and dispose of it in a safe, environmentally responsible way. 
The expected ash falls for Napier are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 Expected Ash Thicknesses for Napier (Hawke’s Bay Engineering Lifelines, 2001) 
Expected Ash Thickness (mm) Frequency of Occurrence (Years) 
0-1 10-20 
1-5 100 
5-50 2200 
50-100 3000 
Over 100 5000 
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Tsunami  
Tsunami are ocean or lake waves caused by displacement of water by seismic or mass 
movements. They are characterised by fast travel speeds of around 950 km/hour, long 
wavelengths of about 200 km and long periods of approximately 10-60 minutes 
(Hawke’s Bay Engineering Lifelines, 2001). Napier is at risk from tsunami, which 
may be caused by a number of mechanisms.   
Submarine subduction earthquakes are more likely to cause tsunami than any other 
kind of earthquake as they tend to have long rupture duration, and may have large 
amounts of displacement along the plate interface, which in turn displaces the water 
above (Hawke’s Bay Engineering Lifelines, 2001). Tsunami may be caused by other 
types of offshore earthquake, however tsunami from this kind of earthquake are 
generally not as large. Terrestrial earthquakes can cause tsunami by generating either 
a coastal landslide, which will displace water as it falls into the sea or by creating a 
submarine landslide displacing water in the same way as a landslide. Evidence shows 
that a large submarine landslide about 3,600 km³ in size may occur every 100,000 
years occurred off the coast of Napier (Hawke’s Bay Engineering Lifelines, 2001).  It 
is almost certain that a submarine landslide this large would generate a major tsunami.  
Napier’s close proximity to a subduction zone and other associated submarine faults 
means it is at real risk from a tsunami. There is evidence to suggest that there have 
been tsunami caused by earthquakes in the past (Hayward et al, 2006). Estimated 
tsunami events for Napier are shown in Table 3.   
Table 3 Maximum Tsunami Heights for Napier (Hawke's Bay Engineering Lifelines, 2001) 
Maximum Tsunami Height  (m) Probability of Exceedance (years) 
8m 10% in 15 years 
11m 10 % in 50 years 
20m 1% in 50 years 
Tsunami cause enormous amounts of damage as the wave flows into an area, 
however damage is also caused by the back flow as the water has often picked up 
large amounts of debris by this time. The force of the water and flooding damages 
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structures, roads and rail are lifted by the water and back scour, sanitation and 
filtration plants are often damaged by flooding also.  
Landslide  
As previously discussed, earthquakes often cause landslides. The 1931 Napier and 
1932 Wairoa earthquakes both caused large landslides including one on Bluff Hill 
Napier, and one that blocked the Te Hoe River at its confluence with the Mohaka 
River. A 30m high debris dam was formed, which formed a lake 5 km long.   
The other common cause of landslides in Hawke’s Bay is extreme weather events. 
High rainfall from events such as Cyclone Bola can cause landslides. Rainfall of more 
than 200 mm a day may cause landslides in some areas while rainfall of more than 
250 mm per day is likely to cause widespread landslide damage (Hawke’s Bay 
Engineering Lifelines, 2001).   
Other Hazards   
Napier and the Hawke’s Bay region are affected by other more frequent events, such 
as flooding, drought and snow. The other most likely event is uncontrolled fires. It is 
unlikely that these events would cause damage on the same scale as earthquakes, 
volcanic ash, tsunami or landslides as there is generally more warning time available 
for meteorological events and the effects are more widely understood from 
experience.    
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1931 Napier Earthquake
Event 
The Napier earthquake occurred at 10:47 am on the 3rd of February 1931. The M 7.8 
earthquake lasted for two and a half minutes (McGregor, 1989; Hawke’s Bay 
Engineering Lifelines, 2001; Hayward et al, 2006; Wright, 2006). During this time 
chimneys, buildings and masonry collapsed and a area of land 90 km x 17 km was 
uplifted a maximum height of 2.7 m as shown in Figure 10. This uplift is attributed to 
the folding of young elastic rocks above a buried fault (Hayward et al, 2006).   
Within minutes of the earthquake, fires broke out when a naked flame knocked over 
in a pharmacy came into contact with flammable materials (Wright, 2006). The 
flames spread rapidly through the town while the Fire Brigade could do little as the 
earthquake had severed the water supply system. The Fire Brigade attempted to back 
fire engines down to the beach however shingle blocked the hoses. As the fires raged 
on, rescuers tried to save as many people as they could, however some were stuck 
under heavy beams and could not be rescued. Some were given morphine and left to 
await the fires as nothing more could be done for them.   
The business area of Napier was hardest hit and this is where the majority of deaths 
occurred as most masonry buildings were destroyed (see Figure 12) (Wright, 2006). 
Heavy parapets, gable ends or ornamental features falling on people caused many 
deaths.  Steel beams not attached to walls trapped many people in damaged buildings; 
others were buried with bricks as they tumbled across the street. The uninjured 
rescued injured often pulling bricks and masonry off them with bare hands.   
The hospital was badly damaged and people were evacuated to the botanical gardens. 
An emergency plan had been prepared six years earlier for this kind of situation. 
Following the plan, an alternative hospital was set up at the Racecourse, with an 
operating theatre and tents to provide accommodation.  In addition, the nurse’s home 
was destroyed killing several nurses who were sleeping in the building. 
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Figure 12 Earthquake and fore damaged CBD, Napier 1931 (www.napier.govt.co.nz)  
The Navy were particularly helpful during the response from the earthquake. The 
HMS Veronica was already stationed in the harbour after arriving in Napier a day 
earlier, as was the freighter the Northumberland which was being loaded with frozen 
meat (Wright, 2006, McGregor, 1989). The Northumberland raised the alarm first at 
11:20 am to ‘all stations’ followed by an alarm from the motor vessel Taranaki a few 
minutes later to Wellington. HMS Veronica radioed naval bases which then passed 
the information on. The HMS Dunedin and HMS Diomede arrived in Napier at 8:30 
am on the 4 of February bringing tents, blankets, beds and shovels.   
Aftershocks left people too scared to stay in their houses and many camped out on the 
beach along Marine Parade, at Nelson Park and other open areas. A large aftershock 
at 9:00 pm caused further damage (Wright, 2006). Another large aftershock on the 13 
of February caused a landslide that blocked a river near Willow Flat. Altogether 525 
aftershocks took place in the two weeks after the main earthquake.   
Nelson Park was organised by the army as a temporary shelter and evacuation centre. 
Latrines were dug, water pipes laid and kitchens set up in the pavilion. Around 2000 
people sent the night of February 4 in tents at Nelson Park. The Napier Earthquake 
Executive Committee decided that for health reasons women and children should be 
evacuated, but able-bodied men were required to stay behind. The Mayor of 
Palmerston North offered to take 5000 refugees. By the end of the first day 1000 
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women and children had been evacuated. Evacuation stopped on the 16th of February, 
by which time 6,700 people had been evacuated through Nelson Park and another 
2,000 had independently evacuated (Wright, 2006; McGregor, 1989).    
Shortly after the earthquake the Napier Citizens Control Committee was formed to 
take care of safety, public health and administration of the town. As people began to 
move back into their houses the committee circulated pamphlets on sanitation and 
health care precautions as well as other safety information.   
Dynamite was required to dig the communal grave. The dead were buried on the 5th 
with an interdominational service held.   
HMS Veronica left on the 10 of February. Over the next few days Acetone and 
Illuminating and Wielding Company LTD, Humphries Cash Groceries opened in their 
undamaged premises and on the 16th the banks opened in an undamaged building  
The earthquake damaged flood protection works. The Prime Minister allocated a grant 
of £10,000 to repair the stop banks before the autumn rains. The work on the stop 
banks was finished within a month (Wright, 2006).  
Recovery 
The morning after the earthquake the Napier Citizens Control Committee was formed, 
and for the following 5 weeks it was the entity primarily responsible for rescue and 
rehabilitation of Napier (Annabel, 2006). On the 11 March retired magistrate J.S 
Barton and retired engineer L.B Campbell were appointed Commissioners of Napier, 
temporarily replacing the city council (Wright, 2006; McGregor, 1989; Annabel, 
2006). The Commissioners along with the Napier Reconstruction Committee headed 
the reconstruction of Napier.   
In the aftermath of the earthquake there was discussion about rebuilding the central 
business district (CBD) of Napier on the other side of the hill near the newly uplifted 
land. However this never eventuated and the CBD was kept in its original location 
with the original colonial street pattern. Rebuilding in the CBD was suspended 
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directly after the earthquake so debris removal could occur and planning matters 
could be resolved (Wright, 2006; McGregor, 1989; Annabel, 2006; McDonald, 2004).   
The Daily Telegraph ran an editorial in April of 1931 commenting on how Santa 
Barbara had been rebuilt after an earthquake in 1925 in the Spanish architectural style 
(Figure 13). This view was supported by Napier’s architects and under the guidance 
of the Napier Reconstruction Committee plans were developed accordingly.             
Figure 13 Typical Spanish Mission Style architecture (www.napier.govt.nz)  
As a result of the earthquake there were new building regulations. The Building 
Construction Act passed at the beginning of 1932 in response to the earthquake 
imposed uniform codes on new construction nationally.  The Act provided standards 
and laid the foundation for additional improvement. However a special fee attached to 
new building permits to fund research into earthquake resistance was not well 
received (Wright, 2006).   
Napier’s recovery followed the phases of recovery outlined by Haas et al (1977):  
1. Emergency Period- Lasted for about 3-5 days after the earthquake during 
which time the dead were recovered and buried, the injured received medical 
attention, temporary accommodation and evacuations organised  
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2. Restoration Period- During this period all services were restored and fully 
repaired. The buildings were demolished, and debris cleared, evacuees 
returned and people moved back into undamaged housing.   
3. Replacement Reconstruction Period -The Market Reserve Building was the 
first building to start construction in August 1931 and finished in June the 
following year. During this time other businesses and homes were rebuilt, the 
economy was kept going with the opening of Tin Town  The end of this period 
would have occurred about January of 1933 with the carnival and celebration 
of the ‘new Napier.  
4. Commemorative, Betterment or Developmental Reconstruction Period- This 
occurred after the new Napier carnival and includes the development of 
Marine Parade- the sound shell, colonnade and commemorative arches. The 
Veronica Sun Bay in commemoration to the sailor of HMS Veronica for the 
help they provided after the earthquake. Also the development of the uplifted 
land into the airport and new suburb of Marewa.  
Tin Town  
As the disaster took place during the great depression, shopkeepers could not afford 
to stay closed for long. A government grant of £20,000 allowed a temporary shopping 
centre to be built. Construction started on February 17.  Shops were located on Clive 
Square while professional offices were set up on Memorial Square. The shopping 
centre was named ‘Tin Town’ as it was built out of corrugated iron shown Figure 14 
(Wright, 2006; McGregor, 1989).  
The Central Business District 
The legislative background for Napier’s reconstruction was provided by the Hawke’s 
Bay Earthquake Act 1931 and the Town Planning Act 1926(Annabel, 2006; 
McDonald, 2004). Under the Town Planning Act every borough council with a 
population over 1000 was required to prepare a town planning scheme and summit 
this to Town Planning Board to be approved. The town commissioners decided not to   
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Figure 14 Tin Town, Clive Square Napier (www.artdecotrust.co.nz)  
plan a scheme that covered the whole of Napier as it would take too long before 
rebuilding could commence. Regulations were changed so that a plan for only the 
CBD could be developed and the usual period of public notification was short cut.   
The plan contained clauses for betterment, street widening and related matters. Street 
widening had been planned before the earthquake as the colonial streets were now too 
narrow for cars. Negotiations occurred with land owners, many did not take 
compensation for street widening as it was for the greater good; for example, shop 
owners on Tennyson St sacrificed 3m from the front of their properties without 
compensation (McDonald, 2004). However £30,000 was paid in compensation to 
property owners at the direction of the Commissioners.  Corners were splayed to 
improve sight lines at intersections for motorists, and service lanes were added 
(Wright, 2006; McGregor, 1989; Annabel, 2006; McDonald, 2004).  
All power and telephone lines were placed in trenches beneath footpaths that were 
formed in concrete slabs so repairs could be easily made (Wright, 2006; McGregor, 
1989; Annabel, 2006; McDonald, 2004). Verandah poles were prohibited; all 
verandahs were suspended with standardised widths and fascia heights. By December 
of 1931 the scheme was ready for inspection and objections. The scheme gained final 
approval by March 1932. The first building to be reconstructed was the Market 
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Reserve building which was planned prior to the earthquake and was used as a symbol 
of recovery from the earthquake.  
Marine Parade 
In addition to the reconstruction of the CBD, Marine Parade the boundary between the 
CBD and the ocean was in need of reconstruction too. The Thirty Thousand Club 
formed in 1913 with the goal of increasing Napier’s population to 30,000 was 
responsible for development of Marine Parade (Wright, 2006; McGregor, 1989; 
Annabel, 2006; McDonald, 2004).   
The Napier Reconstruction Committee, the Commissioners and the borough council 
worked with the Thirty Thousand Club on the redevelopment of the parade (Wright, 
2006; McGregor, 1989; Annabel, 2006; McDonald, 2004). Parts of Marine Parade 
rose along with the rest of the land during the earthquake. Rubble from the town was 
dumped along the foreshore and levelled. This was concreted and an open air 
auditorium and gardens were built, along with the Veronica Sun Bay in 
commemoration of the naval vessel that helped during the earthquake, the sound shell, 
colonnade and arches.    
Harbour 
The land uplifted by the earthquake was leased by the council for development.  In 
1934 a drainage scheme began to prepare the land for development, this included 
diverting the Tutaekuri River and constructing drainage channels for rainwater to 
dilute the salt from the soil (Wright, 2006; McGregor, 1989; Annabel, 2006; 
McDonald, 2004). Development of the suburb of Marewa began in 1935. The road 
layout differed from the rest of Napier at the time with angular and circular streets 
instead of the traditional grid style. The area was promoted as a model garden suburb 
and was used as the model for other Napier suburbs. However it was changed 
considerably by the Labour government’s state housing program.  Some of the state 
houses were begun in the late thirties however construction stopped during the Second 
World War and began again in the fifties (Annabel , 2006).   
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The uplifted lands also settled a long running Napier argument over where the harbour 
should be. As the harbour could no longer be in the former lagoon it was located at 
the base of Bluff Hill.   
Housing 
About 90% of wooden framed houses suffered no damage except for a falling 
chimney (Chapple, 1997). There was some structural damage to two storey houses 
and houses made of wood, including fractures of timber, window panes and roofs in 
some part of Napier. The Hawke’s Bay Earthquake Act granted £1,500,000 to 
Hawke’s Bay, of the grant £1,250,000 was for private relief and the remaining 
£250,000 for local bodies.  
 
The Earthquake Relief Committee allocated £100 per house for housing repairs. A 
reputable builder needed to estimate the costs and then the grant was approved. The 
population of Hawke’s Bay rose by about 6,000 people overnight as people came for 
building jobs. This put pressure on existing accommodation and forced rents up. Rent 
prices did not return to normal until 1936. The increase in population was probably in 
response to people looking for work. The building sector in Napier increased between 
1932 and 1934 when most of the rebuilding occurred. However this caused conflict in 
the community as out of town people were often given work over locals. Most places 
began to employ a certain amount of local people (Wright, 2006).   
Economy 
Napier was an agricultural service town for the Heretaunga Plains (Chapple, 1997). In 
1931 the basis of the economy was agriculture, primarily meat, wool and dairy 
products. Meat and diary products were processed in the area and then exported either 
by rail or from the Port of Napier. Frozen meat that had been awaiting export before 
the earthquake was examined then cleared for export.   
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Implications of 1931 earthquake for New Zealand
The 1931 Napier Earthquake had a profound effect on New Zealand. Formal 
earthquake planning, building regulations and the mechanisms required to fund 
recovery after a natural disaster can be traced back to the 1931 earthquake (Wright, 
2006).   
While the central government provided various forms of assistance, coping with the 
disaster was seen as largely the responsibility of local agencies, which were 
completely unprepared for this task (MCDEM, 1990). Citizens’ committees were 
formed to co-ordinate rescue and relief operations, but their lack of authority and 
support led to difficulties. The Public Safety Conservation Act in 1932 was passed in 
response to such problems. However the Act made no provision for either central or 
local organisations to plan for disasters. The few local authorities that did take note of 
Hawke’s Bay’s experience and prepared to meet similar crises did so, on their own 
initiative; by this action they provided the basis for wartime civil defence. Civil 
Defence was more formally organised during the Second World War but its 
beginnings were as a result of the destruction of the Napier earthquake.   
The loss of life and devastation to the buildings in the CBD of Napier were the 
catalyst for the beginnings of a building code in New Zealand (Wright, 2006). By 
1931 technology had advanced to make buildings designed to withstand earthquakes. 
Building codes were drawn up in 1931 specifically from the Napier quake and in 1932 
Standards New Zealand was established. They produced model building bylaws to be 
adapted by local authorities. Earthquake insurance was available in 1931 but the 
majority of people did not consider it necessary. However, as technology increased 
and more was known about engineering buildings to withstand earthquakes, 
compulsory earthquake insurance began in 1944 (Wright, 2006).  
The pre planning that occurred before the 1931 earthquake did help significantly in 
the post event situation. The hospitals pre planning of an emergency site helped to 
ensure that patients received adequate care after the hospital was damaged, and 
existing patients did not suffer additional stress or injury.  Pre planning of street 
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widening and service lanes which was incorporated into the rebuilding has meant that 
the traditional colonial street pattern is still functional today. This shows that pre 
planning for recovery is a valuable asset.   
 Differences between 1931 and Today
Perhaps one of the most striking differences between today and 1931 is the change in 
the social structures of society. Communities now have more high density housing 
and greater ethnic mixing than in 1931. This results in many changes.   
As a consequence of high density living there is a possibility of more racial mixing 
which means that there are different languages and cultures mixing together. In a time 
of disaster this can leave one ethnic group more vulnerable than another as they may 
have less access to resources and have language and cultural barriers. They may also 
be less likely to have family in other locations that they may stay with immediately 
after the disaster.   
Many people who lived through the 1931 earthquake had lived through or served in 
the First World War. Many of the earthquake survivors that had served in the war 
compared the scenes after the earthquake to what they had seen on the battlefield 
(Wright, 2006). It may also be argued that there was more of a sense of community 
between people in 1931, because neighbours were known compared to now where 
they often remain strangers.   
High density living puts more pressure on infrastructure as there is a concentrated use 
in a small area. This may cause more bottle-necks in traffic when trying to evacuate 
people. In 1931 not every household owned a car. These days most households own at 
least one car which increases the number of cars on the road and consequent 
congestion during evacuation. Evacuations for Hurricane Katrina began 2 days before 
the hurricane made landfall. It took 2 days for New Orleans to be evacuated 
essentially of all car owners. The were so many cars that even with all lanes open for 
outgoing traffic many evacuees were stranded in their cars on the highways when the 
hurricane hit (Department of Homeland Security, 2006).   
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This also shows another change in communities now. People have more invested in 
their homes and contents than in 1931. As well as the earthquake occurring in the 
depression it occurring in a time of less technology and therefore less ‘home 
comforts’ which greatly reduced the economic effect of the disaster compared to a 
similar event today. However by having more invested in homes and contents people 
may be encouraged to have insurance. Disaster insurance is available for anyone who 
has home and contents insurance through the Earthquake Commission (EQC). If a 
person has house insurance they automatically received disaster insurance, however 
only land is covered during a flood or storm.  This is often because people live in 
flood prone areas and may not be covered for flooding through their insurance 
company. Therefore they are not covered by EQC.    
Another major difference between today and 1931 is differences in legislation and 
understanding in environmental processes. In 1931 it was not understood how 
earthquakes occurred. Today much more is known about what causes natural 
disasters. There are Building Codes to ensure buildings are constructed to resist the 
forces of earthquakes. The environment has become much more important now and 
there is legislation in place (RMA 1991) to ensure it is protected; for example, debris 
from an earthquake could no longer be dumped on the oceans foreshore.    
Our dependence on lifelines is more pronounced than in 1931. We rely more on 
appliances and power supplies for everyday life than communities in 1931 did. We 
rely on unseasonable food that needs to be transported and stored. People are less 
likely to be self reliant now than they were in the thirties. The form of money used has 
changed to the extent where most people do not carry cash. If a disaster causes loss of 
power then these people are left without the means to withdraw money as no eftpos 
and ATM systems would function.   
Changes in ownership of infrastructure would also change the way in which lifelines 
where restored. In 1931 most lifelines were government owned, which meant that 
their first responsibility lay with the public (Wright, 2006); whereas today not all 
lifelines are government owned and the owners’ first responsibility may often be to 
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shareholders to ensure profits are not lost, than restoring services as quickly as 
possible.   
Conclusions
Napier is at risk from numerous hazards as a result of its close proximity the 
Hikurangi Subduction Zone. 
The 1931 earthquake and associated fires caused the worst natural disaster in 
New Zealand’s history.  
As the earthquake occurred during the depression the main focus was on 
reopening shops as soon as possible 
To prevent shoddy construction and to allow debris removal building was 
prohibited until the rebuilding was planned and a temporary shopping centre 
was built.   
The recovery of Napier included mitigation measures such as street widening, 
services laid under pavements, and new building codes.  
Pre planning which gave to reconstruction a focal point to centre recovery 
around. The pre planning played a significant part in the recovery of Napier.   
The rebuilding took inspiration from America, in the Spanish Mission and Art 
Deco styles instead of traditional colonial architecture 
The Napier earthquake changed how disasters were managed in New Zealand 
by leading to compulsory earthquake insurance, building codes and foundation 
of Civil Defence.  
Recovery today would be different from recovery in 1931 as communities, 
vulnerability and legislation have changed, as well as the ownership of 
lifelines services.         
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Chapter 4-Relevant Legislation  
Introduction
The legislation relating to natural disaster and hazards in New Zealand is broad and 
complex. The three Acts that underpin natural hazard and disaster management are the 
Resource Management Act 1991, the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 
2002 and the Building Act 2004. All of these acts are focused towards sustainable 
management and development, which is a holistic approach and integrates many 
different environments and groups. Disaster recovery needs to integrate many 
different environmental systems and the laws which govern them. These laws are 
focussed on reduction and preparedness, two important aspects of hazards 
management; however, they are not focused towards being functional for use during 
recovery after a disaster.  
Resource Management Act 1991
Background
Resulting from environmental problems in the 1970s the first United Nations Earth 
Summit was held in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972. This was the first time that 
sustainable development was discussed by world leaders as a means of resource and 
environmental management. It was not until the 1980s in New Zealand when two 
major Acts (Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 and the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1977) needed to be reviewed, that the idea of sustainable development 
became the underpinning principle of legislation.   
The Resource Management Bill was prepared under a Labour government and put to 
Parliament in 1989; however, Labour then lost the 1990 election. The Resource 
Management Bill was revised by the National government and passed in 1991 as the 
Resource Management Act. This new Resource Management Act repealed 78 other 
acts and statues. The Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”) was groundbreaking, 
being the only piece of legislation that managed water, land and air under one law.  
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Putting it into practice
The RMA’s approach to environmental management is through the principles of 
sustainable management and integrated management of all resources. The main 
difference between the RMA and other legislation in New Zealand is that it is effects-
based. This means that no activities are specifically legislated against, but the actual, 
potential or cumulative effects are. These effects are legislated by policies, plans and 
objectives at three different levels (see Figure 15).  
Plans and Policies
How these plans and policies interact is shown in Figure 15.  
National Policy Statement- The only mandatory National Policy Statement is the New 
Zealand Coastal Policy Statement. Central government may set policies for matters of 
national significance.   
Regional Policy Statement- This allows the regional councils to outline a broad 
direction and framework for managing the resources in their region. The Regional 
Policy Statement is mandatory.   
The Regional Policy statement outlines the policies and objectives dealing with 
natural hazards; however it is often generic stating that the council will aim to avoid, 
remedy or mitigate natural hazards. It often does not differentiate between the 
different hazards that affect the region.   
The district/city council only has to take responsibility for natural hazards if it is 
outlined in the regional policy statement that they shall. Their only responsibility is 
what is outlined in the policy statement. If no district authority is outlined then it 
automatically becomes the regional council’s responsibility. Previously a regional or 
district plan could 'not be inconsistent' with a regional policy statement. To ensure that 
councils followed through on their policy statements there was an amendment in 2005 
to the effect that regional and district plans must now ‘give effect to’ the policy 
statement. This means that now all policies and objectives must adhere to the policy 
statement.  
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Figure 15 Hierarchies of Plans (Ministry for the Environment, 2006)  
Regional Plan- The regional plan outlines the rules that will be used to control the use 
of resources and aims to assist the authority to carry out its function. The only 
mandatory Regional plan is the Regional Coastal Plan.   
District Plan – The district plan outlines the rules that will be used to control the use 
of resources and aims to assist the authority to carry out its function. District Plans are 
mandatory.  
Council Responsibilities  
The regional and district councils have very different responsibilities which are 
outlined in the RMA 1991. The regional council has responsibility for the use of 
resources, including natural hazards. District councils have responsibility over land 
use and the placement of physical resources including infrastructure.  
Consents
Applications for resource consents must be made under the RMA. If the adverse 
effects of an activity are found to be more than minor then those effects must be 
remedied, mitigated or avoided. If this is not possible then the resource consent will 
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not be granted. In some cases, consents must be publicly notified to allow members of 
the public to have an input into the decision making process.   
Other Legislation 
The RMA 1991 has ties to many other acts. Listed below are the other Acts that relate 
to the RMA 1991 and are relevant to this study:  
o Building Act 2004 
o Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
Act 2002 
o Local Government Act 2002 
o Historic Places Act 1993   
The relationship between these acts and the RMA 1991 is discussed later in this 
chapter.   
Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002
Background 
The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (“CDEM Act 2002”) replaced 
the Civil Defence Act 1983 as New Zealand’s disaster management legislation on the 
1 December 2002. Since 1983 changes to government structures and disaster 
management best practice made the Civil Defence Act 1983 obsolete. The CDEM Act 
2002 introduces these new structures and best practices directly into the legislation.  
Differences between Acts
The underpinning themes of the CDEM Act 2002 are the 4Rs (readiness, reduction, 
response and recovery) and sustainable management. The CDEM Act 2002 also takes 
an all hazards and risk management approach, which was lacking from the previous 
(1983) Act. Some hazards were not envisaged in the 1983 Act such as technological 
failure. The other major difference between the two acts is the inclusion of public 
participation into disaster planning and decentralising the control towards local 
governments (MCDEM, 2005).   
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Civil Defence Emergency Management Structure
The CDEM Act 2002 specifies how civil defence management is to be run in New Zealand.    
Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management -   The role of the Director of CDEM is 
to advise the Minister of Civil Defence, identify risks and hazards of national importance, 
develop guidelines and standards and control resources during a national disaster.  
Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (CDEM Groups) – CDEM groups are a 
central component of the CDEM Act 2002. CDEM Groups comprise members of regional 
and local councils chaired by the Mayor or other delegated representative. The Group must 
prepare CDEM Group plans and manage hazards and risks within the 4R’s framework 
(CDEM, 2005).  
Each CDEM Group must also prepare a Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan, 
which needs to include such information as liability of local authorities for financial and 
other resources necessary in a disaster, the arrangements for declaring a state of emergency, 
and the co-ordination between other Groups. CDEM Groups must consult with the public 
over their group plans and allow time for submissions to be made. The plan must be 
reviewed every five years. A hazard register is required to compare disasters and list 
disaster that have occurred on properties to help prevent them reoccurring. 
Emergency Declarations and Powers
State of Emergency- under the CDEM Act 2002 the Mayor (or delegated representative) or 
Minister may declare a state of local emergency. The Minister may declare a state of 
national emergency. Declared emergencies have a duration of 7 days. This time period may 
be changed as needed.  
Emergency Powers- emergency powers entitle CDEM groups and controllers to: 
o Close roads/ restrict access 
o Remove/secure dangerous structures/materials 
o Provide rescue, first aid, food, shelter etc 
o Provide essential supplies and regulate traffic 
o Dispose of dead persons and animals 
o Advise the public 
o Provide equipment 
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o Enter or evacuate premises 
o remove vehicles  
o request equipment/materials and assistance 
Other Legislation
The CDEM Act 2002 relies on and works in partnership with other acts:   
o Building Act 2004 
o Resource Management  Act 1991 
o Local Government Act 2002  
Other Acts also work with the CDEM Act 2002. However, these acts are not of significant 
relevance to this study.  
Local Government Act 2002
Background
In 1989, local government was reformed significantly with the amalgamation of 700 
councils into 12 Regional Councils and 73 District or City councils. The main statutes of 
local government changed again when in 2001-2 Parliament passed three new acts – Local 
Electoral Act 2001, Local Government (Rating) Act 2002 and Local Government Act 2002 
(“LG Act 2002”). These new Acts clarified councils’ responsibilities with other Acts 
(Resource Management Act 1991, Biosecurity Act 1999 and others).  The new Acts also 
gave the council more flexible powers and tools to fulfil their obligations. 
Roles and Responsibilities  
Regional and District councils have separate responsibilities under the Local Government 
Act 2002 and the Resource Management Act 1991.   
Regional Councils – the Regional Council’s responsibilities include:  
o Sustainable regional well being 
o Managing the effects of using fresh water, land, air and coastal waters, by 
developing Regional Policy Statements and by issuing resource consents 
o Manage rivers, mitigate soil erosion and flood control 
o Regional emergency management and civil defence preparedness 
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o Regional land transport planning and contracting passenger services, harbour 
navigation and safety, oil spills and other marine pollution  
o Natural hazard management  
District/ City Councils - the District Councils’ responsibilities includes:  
o Sustainable District well being  
o Provision of local infrastructure, including water, sewage, Stormwater and roads 
o Environmental safety, health, district emergency management and civil defence 
preparedness, building control, public health inspections and other environmental 
and health matters 
o Controlling the effects of land use (hazardous substances, natural hazards and 
indigenous biosecurity) noise and effects of activities on surface of lakes and 
rivers (Ministry for the Environment, 2006)   
Long Term Community Council Plans - The Long Term Community Council Plan 
(LTCCP) outlines community direction and finances over the next 10 years. The plan 
is required to be updated every 3 years. It outlines the goals and objectives for the 
community and describes the activities of the council and is required to give the 
public the opportunity to participate.   
Other Legislation 
The most relevant Acts that relate to the LG Act 2002 for the purposes of this study are the 
CDEM Act 2002, the Building Act 2004 and the RMA 1991.  
Building Act 2004
Background
The Building Act 2004 replaces the Building Act 1991. The 2004 Act was introduced to 
improve building controls and practices, which had led to building problems (“leaky 
homes”). It establishes more licensing and accreditation for construction workers. The new 
Act also provides more protection for homeowners and introduces mandatory warranties.  
Another reason for updating the Building Act 1991 was to align the new Building Act more 
closely with the RMA. The purpose of the Building Act is to ensure the safety of people 
using buildings, ensure that buildings are designed so people can escape from fire, and 
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ensure buildings are designed and constructed and used in ways which promote sustainable 
development (Building Act 2004: Section 3). 
Plans and Policies 
The Building Act requires building consents to be applied for when building a new 
structure or renovating an existing structure. Some buildings may require both a 
building consent and resource consent. Under the Building Act 2004, building 
consents now expire if work has not started within 12 months of the consent being 
issued.   
Under the Building Act 2004, sections 30-39, a Project Information Memorandum 
(PIM) can be applied for. This document shows information on the property that is 
useful if building a new structure or adding an extension to an existing structure. A 
PIM includes information on the location of services, special land features including 
natural hazards, any Historic places or Department of Conservation protection orders 
and any consent that may need to be applied for.  
The Building Code 2004
The Building Code is a schedule to the Building Act and is performance- and National 
Standard-based. The purpose of the Building Code is to outline the functional 
requirements for buildings and the performance criteria a building must comply with 
for its intended use (Building Act 2004: Section 16). The existing building code is 
currently being reviewed to align itself with the new purposes of the Building Act 
2004.   
Currently under review in the building code are the safety objectives, particularly the 
structural safety objectives. Under Safety Objective 1- Loss of structural integrity, 
stability and support it is proposed to include tsunami, coastal erosion and volcanic 
eruption design and construction performance criteria to mitigate the effects of these 
hazards.   
Under the Building Code structures should have 90% chance of surviving their 
expected lifetime. This is usually 50 years for most structures. Structures should also 
be built to survive certain events. Depending on the hazard this ranges from a 500 
year return period event to a 50 year return period. However, structures, which are 
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essential for emergency operations or are public buildings, should be built for a return 
period of 2500 years.   
Historic Places Act 1993
Background
The purpose of the Historic Places Act 1993 (“HP Act 1993”) is to protect places of 
significant historic values while still giving landowners property rights. The HP Act 
1993 was intended to incorporate the perseveration of historic places into the RMA 
1991 framework.  
Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987
Under Section 44a of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 
1987, the district or city council must compile a Land Information Memorandum 
(LIM) report. The report details information that the council holds about a property. 
Most people apply for a LIM report when they are considering buying a new property. 
A short list of what is involved in a LIM report is detailed below, however a more 
thorough account can be found in Appendix A.    
A LIM report contains information on:  
o Planning- Zoning, consents, proposed changes to zoning 
o Building- consents and permits, building warrant of fitness 
o Health- Liquor license, registered premises 
o Engineering- Flooding and Inundation, erosion, subsidence, falling debris, 
slippage, alluvion, fill 
o Rates- Land value, annual rates and water charges  
Other information can be included in a LIM report at a council’s discretion.  
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Interaction of Legislation and Disaster Management
The two major Acts that control mitigation of natural hazards are the RMA and the 
Building Act 2004. These Acts work together by making policies to control the effect 
of structures on the environment and the quality of these structures.   
The RMA is concerned with the effect an activity will have on the environment if it is 
exposed to natural hazard. There are multiple sections of the RMA that refer to natural 
hazards. Sections 30, 31, 35, 45, 58, 59-68 and 72-76 (for detailed outline see 
Appendix A) outline the responsibilities regional and district councils have to control 
land use to avoid or mitigate natural hazards. In addition, these sections outline how 
regional and district plans should be prepared with the acknowledgement of natural 
hazards.  
Sections 106,108,220 and 229 consider the effect that natural hazards have on 
subdivisions. Therefore, a subdivision cannot be built on an area of land that is at risk 
from natural hazards. These sections also provide for esplanade strips and reserves to 
mitigate natural hazards. The RMA 1991, Section 2 defines natural hazards as: 
 ‘any atmospheric or earth or water related occurrence (including earthquake, 
tsunami, erosion, volcanic and geothermal activity, landslip, subsidence, 
sedimentation, wind, drought, fire, or flooding) the action of which adversely affects 
or may adversely affect human life, property, or other aspects of the environment’. 
Sections 329-330B provide for work to be undertaken during a time of emergency 
without resource consent in accordance with the CDEM Act 2002. An example of 
what would be possible under this section would be equipment needing to enter the 
bed of a river or lake for emergency flood bank repair (Elizabeth Lambert, pers 
comm. 2007). Under this section, the work could be done without resource consent. 
However, the council needs to be notified of this activity within 7 days. If an adverse 
effect results from the emergency works then resource consent must be applied for 
within 20 days.   
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Sections 71 to 74 of the Building Act deal with building structures on land subject to 
natural hazards.   
Natural hazards are defined in this section as: 
Erosion (including coastal erosion, bank erosion, and sheet erosion): 
o Falling debris (including soil, rock, snow, and ice): 
o Subsidence 
o Inundation (including flooding, overland flow, storm surge, tidal effects and 
ponding): 
o Slippage.  
A building consent must be refused if:  
o the construction or alteration of a building occurs on land subject or likely to 
be  subject to one or more natural hazards 
o the building work  is likely to accelerate, worsen or result in a natural hazard 
on that land or any other property.  
However if adequate provision has or will be made to: 
o protect land, building work or other property from natural hazards 
o restore any damage caused by the building work  
then the building will be allowed to go ahead.   
The CDEM Act 2002 and the RMA 1991 use the principle of sustainable management 
as part of their purposes and define it as:   
o sustainable management means managing the use, development, and 
protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which 
enables people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and 
cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety while— 
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a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding 
minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future 
generations; and 
b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems; and 
c) Avoiding, remedying or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on 
the environment.   
However, the Building Act 2004 also uses the principles of sustainable development 
as part of its purpose. The Building Act 2004 does not define sustainable 
development; therefore a general definition of sustainable development can be used. 
Thus, sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs 
(Brundtland Report 1987).This shows that while the Building Act 2004 is supposed to 
have aligned with other current legislation the wording used is contrary to the CDEM 
Act 2002 and the RMA. By using sustainable development in place of sustainable 
management, the Building Act is showing that development is still its focus.   
The RMA and the HP Act 1983 and the Building Act 2004 work together by ensuring 
that historic buildings are not demolished unnecessarily.    
There are, however, some parts of these acts, which do not work well together. The 
RMA approach is to let regions and districts decide what issues are relevant for them 
and plan accordingly. This is in direct contrast to the Building Act 2004, which 
through the Building Code requires national standards.  
Effects of Legislation on Recovery 
The current legislation will greatly affect recovery in New Zealand, as it is the rules 
outlined through these statutes that will still apply during a recovery phase unless 
government suspends them. Recovery will take place after the state of emergency has 
been lifted therefore any special activities that are allowed during a state of 
emergency are revoked.   
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District and city plans contain rules and objectives a district or city will enforce to 
control natural hazards.   
An example of these rules is shown in Box 1 from the proposed City of Napier 
District Plan, Chapter 62 Natural Hazards:   
These are usually specific to the hazards that affect a certain area. Often these rules 
are generic for major hazards but very specific for more frequent events like flooding. 
Most rules and objectives for other natural hazards aim to avoid, remedy or mitigate. 
Many of these rules are in place because much of the development already occurs in 
places at risk to natural hazards.  
To regulate existing development and ensure that future development does not occur 
in hazardous areas the Building Act 2004 and RMA 1991 are invoked. However just 
as this legislation is appropriate for existing and future land use it may not be 
appropriate when changes are to be made during recovery. These rules should be 
reviewed for a time of recovery so that appropriate changes can be more effective.   
Any new legislation that occurs during recovery needs to be able to work with the 
existing acts. Often moratoriums on rebuilding are used to prevent rapid rebuilding 
Box 1Example of Objectives, Methods and Policies in District and City Plans ( Proposed City of 
Napier  District Plan., 2007) 
Objective 62.3  
To manage the effects of natural hazards on land uses throughout the City. 
This objective relates to Issues 62.2.1 and 62.2.2. 
Methods 
(1) District Plan Rules. 
(2) Establishment of a Hazard Register and provision of known hazard risk information 
collected and collated by the Council in all LIM’s and PIM’s. 
(3) Identification of known hazards on the Council’s GIS database. 
(4) Physical works such as the beach renourishment scheme, or the provision of 
pumps to mitigate floodwaters. 
Objective 62.4 
To control the effects of land uses and development on areas subject to natural hazards 
throughout the City. 
Policies 
In order to achieve this objective, the Council will: 
62.4.1 Direct development away from areas known to be subject to natural hazards. 
62.4.2 Control existing development in areas subject to natural hazards. 
62.4.3 Monitor the state of the natural hazard. 
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and give time for new regulations to be thought through and planned. If these new 
regulations were partially thought through beforehand, then rebuilding could begin 
earlier. These changes may be a combination of things such as land use changes, 
changes to the building code and different architectural styles.  
Changing the district or city plans can be a long, slow process. The group or person 
seeking a plan change needs to file a detailed assessment of environmental effects, 
which takes additional time (James Mineham, pers comms, 2007).  
Regional plans are generally slightly different. A Coastal Plan is mandatory so all 
coastal hazards are covered here. Coastal hazards are also covered in natural hazards 
sections of Regional Plans as well as the natural hazards sections of city and district 
plans if the region is coastal. Therefore, coastal hazards receive higher coverage than 
other hazards. Regional Plans contain rules and objectives to avoid, remedy or 
mitigate natural hazards. They may also include coastal hazards zones, which have 
additional rules. However, there are generally no provisions to change any rules 
during a recovery or response phase.   
This kind of approach towards managing natural hazards has both negative and 
positive features. As coastal plans are mandatory, coastal hazards are usually dealt 
with more thoroughly than other hazards. However, the treatment of the coast may 
give the impression that coastal hazards are of greatest importance, when there may 
be another hazard, which may have greater or equal risk, except that it is dealt with 
differently as it is not in the coastal zone.   
One positive feature is that regions can plan the best way for them to deal with each 
hazard instead of following standards that may not work or be applicable to the 
particular region, this follows on to recovery changes. Recovery changes in local 
plans, which have been developed specifically for a region, may not be suitable for 
the whole country, for example, recovery changes related to volcanic hazards may not 
be applicable in the South Island of New Zealand where they are no currently active 
volcanoes.   
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PIMs and LIMs could have more of a role in recovery planning especially for existing 
structures. Recovery plans could be added to particularly vulnerable properties’ LIMs, 
stating changes that will need to be completed if a disaster occurs. The changes will 
have to be relative to the amount of repair that is needed. PIMs could contain more 
information about zoning changes likely to occur during recovery; depending on what 
the current zone is these changes may be able to begin before a disaster occurs which 
could reduce the effects.   
The Building Code can facilitate changes during recovery. These changes should 
include any updated technology that may have been developed especially regarding 
structural safety or other changes such as floor heights or building materials.   
The HP Act 1993 needs to work in with any changes too. Damaged historic buildings 
may not always be built to required standards. Therefore retrofitting of historic 
buildings should take place when possible. Care should be taken during recovery that 
historic buildings are not demolished unnecessarily.   
The RMA needs to be carefully considered for environmental problems that may 
occur as a result of a disaster. There is usually a massive amount of debris from the 
damage caused by the disaster. Places to dispose of debris need to be carefully 
considered. Many places around towns and cities are not suitable for rubbish disposal 
and many existing dumps may not have the right facilities or space to deal with large 
amounts of debris (Elizabeth Lambert, pers comms, 2007). Before a disaster occurs a 
landfill for disaster-related material should be selected and feasibility study done so 
that it can be used soon after the disaster for disposing of debris.   
Other problems will inevitably occur as a result of the consent process required by the 
RMA and the Building Act 2004. It is likely that the council staff will not be able to 
cope with the amount of consents and other problems that will arise from a disaster. A 
way to streamline consents may be initiated especially those consents which require a 
building consent and a resource consent for building work. As this process will take 
up the time of two departments, there will also need to be inspection of the building 
work and depending on the consent there maybe a monitoring condition as part of the 
resource consent.  
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It seems that the LTCCP is currently the best plan to incorporate recovery measures. 
However it is still not perfect. The LTCCP outlines the development that the 
community has approved for the next ten years. It also outlines the finances of each 
council department. Recovery planning could be incorporated in this plan in each 
section which shows how this department will rebuild after a disaster. This would 
allow for public participation on recovery matters and it would be updated regularly. 
However this would not necessarily be an effective plan if a disaster did occur, as this 
kind of plan may not include important recovery factors such as temporary housing or 
business premises. In addition these plans would be general objectives rather than 
specific rules and would rely on the discretion of the councils to include and prepare 
recovery plans.  
Conclusions
Several different kinds of legislation relate to disaster management in New 
Zealand; much of the legislation integrates different environmental systems 
and has been designed to work with other statutes.  
The three main statues (RMA 1991, Building Act 2004 and CDEM Act 2002) 
that relate to disaster management involve to some degree mechanisms for 
reduction and preparedness of risks.  
However, while some of the statutes have provisions for the response phase of 
the disaster none of them have the capabilities to deal with the unique situation 
that will occur during the recovery phase of a disaster.  
Measures can be taken to change these shortcomings in the legislation, such as 
alternative rules in district and regional plans for a time of recovery, land use 
changes, changes in applications for resource and building consents and 
changes to the building code. 
Additional information and changes to how PIMs and LIMs are used could 
also give members of the public more understanding and information about the 
natural hazards they are exposed to on their property.  
Changes to legislation would be more effective during recovery and would 
speed up recovery if they were planned before the event. This would make  
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sure that the changes would actually work instead of being rushed through in a 
time of disaster.  
At this time the best plan to include recovery plans would be the LTCCP, 
however this is not designed as a recovery plan and while recovery plans 
included in the LTCCP would be better than no plan it is still not ideal.  
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Chapter 5 - Recovery Plan Templates  
Introduction
The concept behind these recovery plans is that they include enough information to be 
used for any type of large scale disaster in any town or city in New Zealand. A series 
of plans have been developed to be used in conjunction with each other. They have 
been kept simple so that they can be adapted to a specific situation for a specific 
place. A pre-event planning component has been combined with a post event plan. A 
critical factor of recovery is communication between the agencies involved in 
recovery. Without communication, recovery of an area will not be as swift or 
effective.  
Components of Pre event planning
Pre event planning combines planning actions to be taken before the disaster with 
actions to be taken after the event. Figure 16 shows the components of pre event 
disaster planning. A community is made up of four environments: built, natural, 
economic and social. These environments interact with each other and determine the 
amount and type of disaster management to be used. In New Zealand disaster 
management there are different agencies which manage different parts of each 
environment.   
For example part of  the social sector is managed by Work and Income New Zealand, 
Housing New Zealand, Victim Support, Salvation Army and the Red Cross to name a 
few.   
All of these agencies need to have contingency plans so that they can operate 
efficiently during a disaster. They need to ensure that they know what the other 
agencies are doing to avoid duplications in services. This follows on to businesses that 
need to plan and insure for disasters. This includes insuring for damage to premises, 
loss or damage to stock and loss of earnings (Nigel Simpson, pers comms, 2007).     
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Figure 16 Components of Recovery Planning  
Disaster management in New Zealand is governed by the 4 R’s (reduction, readiness, 
response, recovery). Therefore all agencies, businesses and environments need to 
engage the concepts of risk reduction and readiness in preparation for a disaster.   
All of the components are incorporated in to a pre disaster plan which outlines matters 
that can improve the post disaster situation to increase resilience and sustainability. 
This follows on to the post disaster plan which is used after an adverse event and uses 
what was considered in the pre disaster plan, however it may be necessary to modify 
parts of these plans.    
In Figure 16 each coloured box represents a plan made during this study which is 
discussed further below.  
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Built Environment
The built environment plan shown in Figure 17 shows pre event and post event 
actions that need to happen, collectively through the government and by different 
social groups throughout the community. Pre event actions include risk reduction 
measures such as retro fitting structures and encouraging people become insured.    
Post event these same actions are assessed and the measures that were planned pre 
event are included in the rebuilding phase.   
  
91
Figure 17 Built Environment plan
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Social Environment
The social environment along with the built environment interacts and is affected by 
the other environments. Figure 18 shows the social environment, pre event collective 
responsibility is with the agencies that will respond during the disaster ensuring that 
they know what their responsibilities will be and making sure they have the capacity 
to fulfil their duties. The group responsibility lies with businesses and social groups in 
the community for example families who should ensure that they are prepared by 
putting together survival kits and reducing risks by making their homes ‘quake safe’ 
(EQC).   
After the event the agencies need to ensure effected people’s needs are met and 
families need to follow their pre event preparations.    
Pre event Recovery Plan
The pre event recovery plan (Figure 19) outlines vulnerabilities often needing 
attention before a disaster. It also allows for post disaster changes to be thought 
through prior to the event, such as changes to land use, architecture styles and areas 
available to development, so that the time taken for legislation to be modified to allow 
the changes to be made will be reduced. By identifying vulnerabilities before a 
disaster occurs time is available to reduce these vulnerabilities to decrease the damage 
from a disaster.   
A path through the plan has been highlighted by yellow boxes shown in Figure 19. 
Following through the boxes in number order the contents of the boxes are described 
further below:   
o Box 1: These are the four environments that make up a community, each 
environment needs to be considered at every step through the diagram, and 
whether the effects from one environment will flow on to another.   
o Box 2: All possible effects of disasters need to be considered for environment. 
The vulnerabilities and resiliencies of these environments likely to affect a 
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region needs to identified, so they are covered in the plan. The scale of these 
impacts needs to be identified; a drought for example may severely affect a 
regions economy but will not damage houses.   
o Box 3: After these vulnerabilities have been identified a number of mitigation 
strategies will be available, it will be possible to implement some as part of 
maintenance, however it may not be possible to include mitigation measures 
for all hazards, as often building designs to mitigate tsunamis may increase 
earthquake risk. Other mitigation methods may only be implemented after a 
disaster occurs.   
o Box 4: considers the mitigation measures that can only be implemented once a 
disaster has occurred. Before the disaster occurs planning of these initiatives 
should be undertaken. Stylized streets can be planned for how these measures 
should be implemented. New measures to be implemented may range from 
widened streets, height restrictions, land use change or services put 
underground.   
o Box 5: A short term goal which should be decided upon before the event that 
is an acceptable time to have services restored. To be successful this will 
probably have two phases. The first aim should be to have services running 
although some parts of the service may have temporary repairs, the next phase 
is to completely repair all services to 100% efficiency. As these services are 
repaired and become more reliable it will be possible for businesses to open. 
For this reason businesses should be encouraged to develop their own 
contingency plans to prepare for a post disaster situation. This includes 
insurance for lost earning, damage or loss of stock and damage to buildings or 
equipment and also emergency equipment such as back up generators for 
lighting, water or machinery.   
o Box 6: Once this plan is finalised then the plan should be reviewed and 
updated over an agreed timeframe by all agencies involved. This is so any 
legislation changes, technology changes or community changes can be 
integrated into the plan. Any mitigation measures that may have been 
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accomplished since the last review can be evaluated and new mitigation 
measures discussed.  
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Figure 18 Social Environment Plan 
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Figure 19 Pre Disaster Recovery plan  
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Figure 20 Post Disaster Recovery Plan
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Post-Disaster Recovery Plan
The post disaster recovery plan outlines the actions of the pre disaster plan that will be 
carried over to the post event situation. There are activities that can not be finalised 
until the disaster has happened, however most of these things can be partially planned 
before the event leaving more time for any unexpected events to be assessed.   
The post disaster plan which is shown in Figure 20 follows a path in number order 
through the plan, further information from each box is described below: 
o Box 1: The first action after a disaster is to assess the level of damage, what 
percentage of damaged buildings and infrastructure can be repaired and what 
needs to be demolished and rebuilt. It may not be necessary to rebuild all of 
the buildings that have been damaged or they may be rebuilt in a different 
way.   
o Box 2: The next action is to look at the pre disaster plan and decide what parts 
of the plan are applicable to the situation. There may be some decisions which 
are not relevant to this disaster or damage occurred that was unexpected.   
o Box 3: To recover from the disaster the agencies that will be involved in the 
recovery need to be contacted. Depending on the disaster some agencies may 
not be needed. For example a disaster may occur in an industrial area so a 
large number of people will not need temporary accommodation as their 
houses are undamaged.   
o Box 4: Each individual agency will need to evaluate their post disaster plan. 
They may need extra staff to cope or extra equipment and materials for repairs 
could be needed which might delay repairs.   
o Box 5: The timeline for restoration of services estimated in the pre disaster 
plan should be assessed as to its feasibility. The timelines will cover a range of 
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operations from acceptable time for lifelines to be repaired to evacuations to 
preparing temporary housing for displaced people.   
o Box 6: However there may be some areas that need attention over others. This 
will constantly be reassessed as the recovery continues and timelines will be 
reviewed as the need arises for example areas with live wires or leaking water 
mains will take precedence over areas where damage is not as severe 
(Hawke’s Bay Lifelines Group, pers comms, 2007).    
o Box 7: It is likely that no matter what the disaster that some people will need 
temporary accommodation. Over the short term they may be able to stay with 
friends or family however areas where temporary housing can be set up should 
be planned before hand. These areas need to be safe from other types of 
disasters as the construction will not be as strong as a permanent dwelling. 
Businesses may also need temporary premises so that business can continue 
during the rebuilding.   
o Box 8: People affected by the disaster will need to be informed about the 
disaster, the planned recovery and ways that they can be involved in it. Other 
information such as health and safety messages, funding resources and 
reconstruction areas need to be publicised so people who may have evacuated 
and people still in town can be informed.   
o Box 9: Leading on from informing people about recovery is deciding the best 
way to rebuild. This may include changing the district or city plan in terms of 
zoning and land use or rules about building height and styles. National 
standards may be changed or introduced, an example of this is the Building 
Code. The public should be informed and able to participate to a certain 
extent. However the decision process should have limits to the amount of time 
for participation and appeals so as not to delay recovery any longer than 
necessary   
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o Box 10: Interconnected with the policy changes will be the mitigation 
measures which are chosen to be implemented. The mitigation measures 
should not be limited to the particular disaster that just occurred, mitigation 
measures for other disasters should be included where there is the potential to 
increase resilience as much as possible  
Communication and Interdependency
In New Zealand the co-ordinated incident management system (CIMS) is used by 
agencies to co-ordinate response and recovery activities (MCDEM, 2006). All 
agencies that work with Civil Defence, local authorities and Civil Defence groups are 
encouraged to adopt CIMS as their management system. The reason for the use of this 
system across all agencies and groups involved in emergency management is for co 
ordination between all groups and consistent and effective response to and recovery 
from disasters. Common terminology is used and resources shared. Therefore during a 
disaster communication between different agencies and groups should be effective.   
Private and government owned agencies make commitments to help in a disaster 
situation. These agencies deal with similar situations as part of their normal 
functioning and are therefore are appropriate choices during a disaster as they already 
have the needed experience.  For example the New Zealand Police continue to be 
responsible for law and order during and immediately after a disaster. However, as the 
police from the region affected may not be able to cope with the situation, as was 
shown in New Orleans where police deserted their positions (Brinkley, 2006; 
Department of Homeland Security, 2006), additional police will need to be brought 
into the area, which may stretch the resources else where. This is true for most of the 
other agencies involved. They need to fulfil their emergency responsibilities along 
with their day to day running.   
Communication between each group is important as agencies need to know what 
other agencies and groups are doing during and after the disaster. For example 
emergency services (police, ambulance and fire) will need to know the state of roads 
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for search and rescue and therefore will need to contact Transit and the district 
councils for road updates.   
Agencies within certain sectors (built, social, economic and natural) have different 
responsibilities and need to communicate internally and with other agencies 
externally. However external coordination and communication between different 
sectors also needs to occur. The majority of communication between different 
agencies is because they are dependant on each other for certain functions to be 
completed. Therefore a potential problem during recovery is the break down of 
communications between different agencies.   
Shown below in Table 4 is a dependency matrix for the built environment, the list of 
agencies is by no means exhaustive. Agencies were assigned a value from 1-5, with 1 
being low level of dependence and 5 high level of dependence, based on how much 
communication would need to occur between agencies. Matrixes for other 
environments can be found in Appendix B.  The least dependant of the agencies 
involved in the built environment is federated farmers (highlighted in green), while 
the agency that has the most dependencies is the district council (highlighted in red). 
This is because the district council has many roles and responsibilities ranging from 
building and policy to roading which are all components of the built environment. 
This highlights a weakness that may occur during recovery where the district council 
may not be able to fulfil its role as offices may be damaged, documents lost and staff 
killed or injured which may make it more difficult to manage other agencies. This is a 
possibility for any agencies involved. If this were to happen then staff and equipment 
from other regions would have to cover the affected area. This may cause additional 
problems with people unfamiliar to the region becoming decision makers.   
These problems may flow on to other regions of New Zealand as agencies may need 
to call workers in from different centres to fill staff gaps in the affected region. 
Welfare agencies that deal with benefits may find that the additional information from 
disaster affected people may cause delays or problems in other centres. Therefore all 
systems need to be checked thoroughly before a disaster to ensure that the rest of New 
Zealand can still function effectively.   
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From the building environment matrix a lifelines dependency matrix has been 
developed using the same scale. Lifelines as the name suggests, are essential for day 
to day life. Lifelines are essential during recovery as power and water are needed for 
private dwellings but also for a wide range of uses such as, industry, running 
sanitation systems, water purification and banking. Many lifelines have a high 
dependency on each other for instance many pipeline lifelines are laid under roads, 
some lifelines rely on others to run for example water pumps rely on electricity, as 
shown in Table 5.  
Civil Defence has the highest level (highlighted in red) of dependence on lifelines. 
This stems from the organizational role that civil defence play in coordinating 
recovery and needing to know what is functioning so that alternatives can be supplied 
to people who relay on the resources carried by the lifelines. The least dependant are 
highlighted in green.   
Table 4 Built Environment matrix showing interdependencies between groups 
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Lifelines 5 5 3 4 4 4 5 3 4 
District Council 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 4 5 
Engineers 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 2 3 
Architects 2 4 5 2 2 2 3 1 2 
Building Inspectors 3 5 5 3 5 4 4 2 3 
Consents Officers 3 5 4 3 5 4 5 3 3 
Tradesmen 3 2 3 2 4 3 2 2 2 
Planners 3 4 2 4 3 3 1 2 4 
Federated Farmers 3 4 2 2 3 4 2 3 5 
Local Business 4 5 2 4 4 5 2 4 3 
                    
Total 31 38 33 30 35 35 27 35 22 31 
The interdependency of lifelines can create numerous vulnerabilities (Hawke’s Bay 
Engineering Lifelines Group, pers comms, 2007). For example when roads and water  
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supply are damaged it is difficult to get trucks to transport emergency water sources to 
people in need and it can also be difficult to get trucks and equipment into the area 
that need repairs, in addition if the water mains are under roads then the need to be 
fixed before the road, leaving a complex problem to solve. Therefore it is important to 
plan for an event before it occurs so that disruption to these services can be kept to a  
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                                                                Table 5 Example of Built Environment interdependencies- Lifelines Group Matrix dependencies      
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Civil Defence 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 
Transit 5 5 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 2 2 4 
District Council: 
-Local roads 5 5 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
-Drinking water 5 3 3 4 4 2 1 2 4 3 3 2 1 1 2 
-Waste water 5 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 2 1 1 2 
-Stormwater 5 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 2 1 1 2 
Tranzrail 4 5 4 3 3 3 5 3 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 
Port 4 4 5 3 4 4 5 3 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 
Airport 4 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 
Local electricity 
provider 
5 5 5 3 3 3 5 5 5 3 3 5 4 4 2 
Gas providers 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 5 5 3 3 4 4 2 3 
Oil Providers 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 5 5 3 3 3 2 2 3 
Telecommunications 5 5 5 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 2 2 3 3 2 
Cell phone providers 5 5 5 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 2 2 4 3 1 
Radio broadcaster 5 3 3 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 
Regional Council : 
-flood control 5 5 5 3 3 3 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 
                                     
Total 72 64 62 43 41 42 49 58 58 62 50 50 54 45 41 43
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minimum.  Lifelines should be prioritised pre event in terms of most necessary to 
affected people, often roading electricity and water, and most dependant so that these 
services can be repaired as soon as possible. Pre event installations of risk reducing 
equipment can also play a part ensuring lifelines are restores as quickly as possible.    
One of the best ways to increase resilience in lifelines systems is to create 
redundancies, so that if needed damaged sections can be detoured until repairs are 
completed. This added to the success of the Northridge earthquake where the roading 
net works had sufficient redundancies that traffic could be offset onto other roads 
while the damaged section were repaired. This helps to reduce the effect the disaster 
has on transportation systems and means that supplies can be freighter in and out of 
the disaster area to help affected people and recovery the economy.   
Conclusions
Pre event planning for a post disaster situation combined with implementation 
of hazard mitigation techniques can reduce the effects of a disaster thereby 
reducing recovery time. 
The responsibility of pre event planning is shared collectively at government 
level and by different groups throughout the community.  
Pre planning of lifelines which need priority repair can ensure that critical 
services are restored as soon as possible and other services which have 
dependencies their restoration can be coordinated so as to cause the least 
amount of disruption possible.  
Lifelines which are an important part of recovery are highly interdependent. 
This interdependency means that communication between different lifeline 
groups is critical. 
Pre planning of priority lifelines opens lines of communication prior to the 
disaster which can make disaster communication less problematic. 
Using agencies in a post disaster situation to deal with situations they deal 
with on a day to day basis may cause problems. Many of these are government 
agencies and have responsibilities to the rest of country; however they will be 
aware of the procedures to be followed. 
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Chapter 7 - Discussion  
Was the recovery of Napier in 1931 successful? 
The Napier 1931 earthquake remains to this day New Zealand’s worst disaster; did 
Napier make a successful recovery from this disaster? The town recovered from the 
devastation caused by the earthquake using new and innovative processes. Schwab et 
al (1998) outline four sets of decisions which are important to acknowledge when 
planning for a disaster:  
5) Sites for temporary housing, relocation of damages businesses and 
dumping of debris 
6) Closure of roads and bridges 
7) Restoration or relocation of critical infrastructure 
8) Reconstruction or relocation of dwelling units  
Although Napier had no pre event plan in place before the earthquake, Nelson Park 
was set up as a site of temporary housing, just hours after the earthquake. Debris was 
cleared from the business district and deposited along the beach.  Roads and bridges 
were temporarily closed and rebuilt. Critical infrastructure such as electricity, railway, 
and water was restored to the area within days of the earthquake and then full repairs 
were completed. Tin Town was built as a temporary CBD so that business could 
continue during the rebuilding of shops and offices. This shows swift action by the 
community of Napier which was helped by the experiences of the First World War. 
The experiences are probably the reason for some of the actions which occurred after 
the earthquake without prior planning. It is doubtful that this kind of action would 
occur today as very few New Zealanders have that kind of experience to draw back 
on.   
In Napier a strong sense of leadership was present during the recovery with the Napier 
Citizens Committee formed the morning after the earthquake, the Earthquake Relief 
Committee formed soon after, along with the Napier Reconstruction Committee 
(Wright et al 2006). The Napier Borough Council handed power over to 
Commissioners who had control of the city and overall command of decision making. 
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These committees helped in making the recovery a success as they included 
mitigation measures and ensured public participation in their decisions. They also 
acted quickly without on ideas to ensure that what was planned was followed through 
on.   
While the dumping of debris along the beachfront would not be allowed to happen 
now, it was approved in 1931 and along with the uplift of land provided an extra 
buffer between the town and ocean. Comparing what occurred in Napier to the 
decisions highlighted by Schwab et al (1998) then the recovery of Napier would seem 
to have been a success.    
Schwab et al (1998) and Mileti (1999) define other important concepts that are 
particularly relevant during recovery:  
o Consensus Building 
o Providing Information 
o Continuity of Procedures  
o Planning Style  
Rebuilding in the Spanish Mission and Art Deco styles was discussed with the public 
in Napier before the rebuilding, this was a positive step which resulted in this 
architectural style was welcomed by the residents of Napier. As well as it being the 
style of the times there were some pre earthquake buildings already in these styles.  
The local newspaper ran editorials on it as the architectural choice for rebuilding. 
Plans for rebuilding the CBD of Napier included public participation and 
compensation for property owners whose properties were needed to implement some 
of the rebuilding changes.   
Information was readily available. The main form of information, the local newspaper 
who, just days after the earthquake printed leaflets with health warnings about boiling 
drinking water, and sanitation information to limit the spread of disease which was 
feared after the earthquake. The paper also warned people against looting and gave 
information on the rebuilding styles, this helped the police in their duties to control 
order and let the residents of Napier feel included in the overall decisions.   
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Essentially planning procedures were kept the same. There was less legislation to 
follow in 1931 than today, rebuilding in 1931 involved three Acts which were not 
closely related, while today at least five Acts which are designed to work closely 
together and additional plans are involved. However while the procedure was kept the 
same some shortcuts were taken when planning the CBD to reduce the amount of time 
for planning so that rebuilding could occur earlier. However time was still allocated 
for public participation during this planning process. The Commissioners who were 
given the same power and responsibilities as the Borough council consulted with the 
Mayor of the town in the decision making process to make sure the recovery was 
suitable for Napier.  Shortcuts in the planning procedures show that pre event 
planning in this situation would have speed up the recovery further. This also shows 
that while it is important to begin to rebuild as soon as possible to recover the 
community and economy, public participation is a key feature in community 
acceptance of rebuilding styles.    
While the traditional colonial street pattern of early Napier was kept after the 
earthquake it was changed to make the city more modern and functional for 
automobiles. Combined with the traditional layout were the new style buildings which 
mixed the English colonial style street pattern with the new American architectural 
style.   
The main aim of Napier’s rebuilding was to get businesses open as soon as possible, 
as shop owners could not afford to stay closed for long during the depression. Napier 
achieved its aim very successfully with a temporary town built to open shops as soon 
as possible, with the majority of shops open in permanent premises within two years 
of the earthquake. Private houses were not as affected as the CBD of Napier and 
repairs were completed as owners could afford during the depression.   
The end of recovery in Napier was marked by the betterment and commemorative 
phase (Haas et al, 1997). This is shown by the development of Marine Parade which 
involved the construction of the sound shell, the Veronica Sun Bay in tribute to the 
help the town received from the sailors of HMS Veronica shown in Figure 21 and 
Figure 22.   
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Figure 21the sound shell on Marine Parade, Napier   
Figure 22 (A) Shows the Veronica Sun bay on Marine Parade Napier. (B) Inset shows the tribute 
to HMS Veronica, which the sun bay was named after.         
B
A 
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Did recovery in 1931 improve resilience?
During the rebuilding of Napier, hazard mitigation measures were implemented into 
the rebuilding. Ying Wi and Lindell (2004) divide hazard mitigation techniques into: 
o Community Protection Works 
o Land Use Practices  
o Building- Construction Practices  
Napier’s recovery did include measures to increase the resilience of the city. However 
as a result of the earthquake the suburb of Marewa and the airport were developed on 
the uplifted land. This uplifted area has allowed Napier to grow and develop to a large 
city however it has added to the future vulnerability of the city. Community protection 
works were undertaken after the earthquake however this was the repair of the flood 
banks which were damaged in the earthquake. Although later on in 1934 the 
Tutaekuri River was diverted so the uplifted land could be developed and flood risk 
the area would be reduced.   
Land use practices were not used in the recovery of Napier. Napier pre earthquake 
development had been limited by the geography of the area, however with the uplift 
of new land Napier now had room to develop further. Over the years following the 
earthquake the uplifted land was prepared for development and the airport and a new 
suburb Marewa was developed.  Unfortunately in 1931 the mechanisms that caused 
earthquakes were not known. It is now known through the study by Hayward et al, 
(2006) that subsidence is the normal trend for this area resulting in a large area of 
development on a block of land that could potentially subside several metres. 
However this area is extremely vulnerable to earthquake risk, a large proportion of 
residential properties have been developed here in addition transportation links 
including the airport, main rail and road links north pass through this area.        
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Figure 23 (A) Typical Napier street with continuous verandah heights. (B) Splayed corner, note 
the date on the building, the date of construction completion.  
Building and construction practices were the main form of hazard mitigation 
employed during the rebuilding of Napier. This included the formation of a National 
Building Code and the use of reinforced concrete. Street widening had already been 
planned before the earthquake; this was to open the inner city up for traffic use but 
also as firebreaks. As many people in the earthquake were killed by falling structures, 
services such as power were put under ground. The new style of architecture excluded 
from its design ornamentation which could fall off during intense shaking Figure 23.   
While Napier added some resilience measures to its recovery the effect of the 
earthquake has had a profound effect and disaster management in New Zealand. The 
Napier earthquake is responsible for the introduction of a building code, compulsory 
earthquake insurance and the formation of Civil Defence. It is also responsible for the 
allocation of emergency and disaster related government funding. These effects have 
had a major effect on New Zealand and have helped to increase the overall resilience 
of New Zealand to disasters, although while more is known about disasters and their 
causes New Zealand is by no means immune to the effects of natural hazards.  
A B
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Would recovery now be similar to what happened in 1931?
New Zealand is vastly different now to what it was in 1931. Communities have 
changed; they are now more diverse and densely populated.  Properties have 
increased in value with some New Zealand properties now worth than more than $1 
million. As property values have increased so has the contents of people’s home 
relative to 1931. Most families now have at least one car per family, when in 1931 
many families did not a car at all. Many standard appliances did not exist in 1931 
however, they are now commonplace in the majority of houses throughout New 
Zealand Communities are less self sufficient than there were in 1931. For example 
fruits and vegetables are available all seasons round, people are accustomed to a large 
range of convenience foods and rely heavily on electricity to cook, refrigerate and 
freeze food products.   
At the present time more people own additional properties, either as a rental or 
holiday home. Investments in properties and contents have dramatically increased 
since 1931 meaning a large disaster today would have a higher cost than in 1931.  
The people living in 1931 had lived through the First World War, with many serving 
overseas. After the earthquake many compared the devastation to what they had 
witnessed during the war (Wright, 2006). This kind of experience is probably partly 
responsible for some of the quick action especially during the response to the 
earthquake as many people had experienced a similar kind of situation. Today very 
few New Zealanders have experienced a comparable kind of situation and therefore 
maybe less inclined to act in the same way as the people of Napier in 1931.   
While recovery in today’s world would follow the same 4 steps of recovery, the 
overall process could be more complex than what occurred in Napier after the 1931 
earthquake. The main legislation that dictated rules around recovery in 1931 was the 
Town Planning Act 1926, the new building code and the Hawke’s Bay Earthquake 
Act 1931.   
  
113
In New Zealand today there is more legislation to regulate the development and 
protect the environment. Rebuilding a town or city is now a more complex process, as 
rebuilding will need to follow the district and regional plans, the RMA, and the 
building code. This legislation has not been formed to be functional during recovery 
and as yet there are no provisions to short cut any lengthy processes to speed up 
recovery. The RMA and Building Act (2004) require every structure in need of 
rebuilding to apply for both resource consents and building consents. After the 
building work has finished these structures need to be inspected to ensure all 
standards have been met. During recovery this process will add time and will need 
additional people to complete these inspections.   
District and regional plans are design to limit and control development for the 
protection of people and the environment. During recovery development needs to be 
facilitated in a controlled way so new mitigation measures may be put in place. 
Therefore the district and recovery plans should have similar objectives, however the 
district plan at this time lacks the tools to be able to integrate recovery into existing 
rules.   
Disposing of rubbish and debris from a disaster also poses a greater problem than in 
1931. Much of the debris from the Napier earthquake was dumped along the beach 
front. It is very unlikely that this activity would occur now.  Only certain sites could 
be considered for debris disposal and again this would require resource consent and 
monitoring systems. This may be difficult to accomplish depending on how long 
debris clean up takes. In New Orleans debris is still being cleared 18 months after the 
hurricane (Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 2007).    
In normal times these systems work efficiently as there is only a certain amount of 
development and its rate is controlled by this legislation. However after a disaster 
there will be large populations of people needing to rebuild and therefore needing 
consents and inspections. It is likely the council in charge of issuing these consents 
may not be working to full capacity and may have lost records which will add extra 
time to recovery.  While this kind of management is necessary for the protection and 
control of the environment, integrity of structures and development, it may not be the 
most practical way of control during recovery.  
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Materials may also be a problem more so now than in 1931. Forestry makes up a large 
proportion of our GDP, it is unlikely that New Zealand could process enough wood 
products to supply rebuilding after a major disaster and export for profit while still 
farming sustainably. Other resources such as aggregate for concrete may also run 
short if demand is high. However demand for materials will be dependant on the scale 
of the disaster and the style of rebuilding which occurs. This will be different for 
different regions throughout New Zealand.   
In 1931 many lifeline services were government owned. This allowed these services 
to be fixed relatively quickly as the first commitment of government-owned 
companies is to its customers. Today many service companies are privately owned. 
This means often their first responsibility is to stakeholders and profit margins instead 
of customers. There may be delays with repairs as other companies or contractors may 
need to be contacted. There may also be a shortage of qualified people to fix some 
services, such as high voltage sub stations. This may add extra time to the restoration 
of these services.   
Rebuilding of other government projects such as state housing, which did not begin 
until after the 1931 earthquake, would be different. This may adversely affect low 
income families. Instead of having suburbs of state housing the concept of pepper 
potting, spreading a few state houses throughout suburbs, would be preferred. The 
style of house would be different. As people now live more densely, state house 
sections would follow this trend, and retirement type accommodation would be more 
likely to replace family homes as New Zealand has an aging population (Tony 
McCleary, pers comms, 2007)  
The effect of globalisation may also have a profound effect on recovery in today’s 
society. The amount of global companies in New Zealand has certainly increased 
since the thirties. A major problem for New Zealand is that global companies may be 
able to recover their losses more rapidly than small local businesses. Therefore in a 
post disaster situation it may be harder for local businesses to rebuild and regain their 
client base as they may take longer to re-establish than global companies who have 
more resources at hand. Large global corporations are also more likely to have 
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business contingency plans than small owned and operated local businesses where 
this may not be a priority. Global companies may also hinder recovery as new rules or 
zones regarding their building or style of architecture may lengthen the process 
especially if this requires changes to their corporate image. Alternatively some global 
companies may chose to relocate their business to a less hazardous area which again 
may cause conflict during the recovery process. Therefore it is important to consider 
the effect that global companies will have in the recovery of cities.  
Are pre event plans helpful during recovery? 
Preparation of pre- impact recovery plans provides local officials with time to 
consider how the activities that take place during the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster will affect long term recovery (Wilson, 1991).  Therefore pre event planning 
combined with pre event mitigation practises can further reduce the amount of time 
taken to recover by decreasing the number of people killed or injured and may also 
reduce the amount of damage experienced.    
Geis (1996) and Haas et al (1977) suggest that recovery issues resolved in advance, 
by means of disaster scenarios will increase the efficiency and quality of post impact 
decision-making. The pre event plan used for the recovery of the Northridge 
earthquake allowed local officials to resolve planning issues before the disaster 
occurred, instead of trying to sort out problems following a disaster when intense 
pressure to resume pre disaster levels or accommodation and services and lack of time 
are obstacles to overcome (Ying Wi and Lindell, 2004). This is in direct contrast to 
Hurricane Katrina, where numerous issues and a lack of communication between 
recovery groups lead to an unsuccessful response and a slow start to recovery. Part of 
resolving issues that occur during recovery is interagency communication. Pre event 
planning can help to open these lines of communication and make points of contact 
before the disaster, therefore during and after the disaster contact people have already 
been established (Nigel Simpson, pers comms, 2007).   
Other key features of pre event planning that have been highlighted include 
leadership, and the ability and knowledge to act (Rubin, 1985, in Ying Wi and 
Lindell, 2004). During the recovery of Napier strong leaders were capable of making 
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positive decisions for reconstruction, helping to speed up the recovery process. This 
differs to what occurred in New Orleans during and after Hurricane Katrina. Many of 
the leaders (State and Federal) failed to take action or left taking action too late, this 
was illustrated by poor pre event and post event evacuations in New Orleans, leaving 
thousands stranded in the city.   
The recovery of Napier in 1931 was completed with very little pre planning. However 
the small amount of pre-planning that did occur was very successful in the overall 
recovery. The hospital had an emergency plan for evacuating and carrying for patients 
during a time of disaster which proved to be successful. Street widening was pre 
planed in the overall recovery of Napier. However societies are more complex and 
globalised now than in the 1930s, therefore pre event recovery planning reduce 
planning issues and time and help return to a pre disaster level of services quicker 
than if no pre planning had been undertaken.   
Pre event plans can be designed for any disaster situation and can combine many 
groups and courses of action. The overall intended result of a pre event plan is to 
identify vulnerabilities and problems that may occur during a disaster and to attempt 
to remedy them before the disaster occurs. Pre event post disaster planning also 
follows this aim; however it endeavours to plan for the recovery of an area while there 
is time to think decisions through thoroughly. This was a major problem after the 
Boxing Day Tsunami where hasty decisions were made with regard to land access 
(Ingram et al, 2006; Oxfam International, 2006b). These decisions were rushed and 
were later withdrawn as they were not appropriate, slowed recovery and severely 
affected vulnerable communities.    
Milteti (1999), Haas et al (1977) and Schwab et al (1998) outline basic requirements 
that should be included in a pre event plans. These requirements are general to any 
urban population needing to recover from a disaster. However in addition to these 
basic needs are things that will be specific to an area. This is where pre event planning 
becomes necessary at a small scale, as regional variations will result in different 
recovery strategies. Pro active recovery which results with pre event planning is less 
likely to result in poor decision making (Becker et al, 2006) Pre event planning can 
also give individual landowners more input into hazard reduction before a disaster 
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instead of imposing new laws and restrictions on people after the trauma of a disaster 
which may caused additional stress and anxiety to communities.  
Could a recovery plan template be constructed for a NZ setting?
In New Zealand the majority of urban areas were established over 150 years ago, 
principally for convenience and without consideration of natural hazards (Becker et 
al, 2006). New Zealand is a unique country that is at risk to a wide range of natural 
hazards and many urban centres are at risk to a variety of these hazards. Pre event 
planning for recovery can be used as a tool to reduce the effects of a disaster and to 
help facilitate a successful recovery.   
As New Zealand is a small country and is exposed to a wider range of hazards and has 
a smaller population to draw on in times of disaster. A major disaster would affect the 
whole country and may have devastating effects on New Zealand’s primarily 
agriculturally based economy. Horticulture earns $4 billion per year for New Zealand 
and is important at the regional level for the jobs it creates (Jim Anderton, 2007). 
Many natural disasters may result in short and long term effects, this may affect 
agricultural land damaging crops, this occur during the Boxing Day tsunami as many 
orchards were inundated with sea water for many days killing plants (FAO, 2005).  
Other disasters such as weather events and volcanic eruption have devastating effects 
on agriculture. In addition to the effects on the land and stock a disaster many prevent 
harvests as there many not be enough people or machinery or lack of transportation 
may prevent stock being exported. After the disaster plants or animals may die 
meaning that areas need to be replanted or restocked, there may be a period of time 
before produce is ready for harvest again, for example some trees may not bear fruit 
in their first year resulting in long term effect of loss earnings (FAO, 2005).   
Resources needed for a large scale recovery of an area may reduce or stop that 
activity in other regions. For example if rebuilding of large areas of housing, 
businesses and factories was required, this would take materials and trades people 
away from other areas throughout the country. As recovery will usually take a number 
of years this may limit any kind of development in other parts of New Zealand as the 
recovery area would become a priority. This kind of effect may flow on into other 
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areas of New Zealand life. However, it is likely that in this case New Zealand would 
receive help from other countries presumably Australia our closest neighbour.   
Additionally there is the potential for a disaster to effect large parts of the country. 
When the Alpine fault in the South Island of New Zealand next ruptures a significant 
proportion of the Island will be in a state of simultaneous recovery.   
For this reason pre event planning for natural disasters is something that should be 
taken very seriously in New Zealand. Pre disaster planning has the potential to reduce 
the effects of a disaster and to also ensure a more effective recovery especially if 
many urban areas require recovery simultaneously. The legislation in New Zealand 
gives local authorities the control of their own region. This means that these local 
areas are aware of the hazards they are at risk from and can plan in a way which suits 
their area. An example of this is in Central Otago where protection of the natural 
character of the landscape is important. Pre-event planning can ensure that the 
character of the landscape is preserved during recovery and the area is not exploited 
by development during recovery.   
The basis of New Zealand’s disaster management is the 4 R’s. Lessons can be learned 
from Hurricane Katrina which shows how important reduction, preparedness and 
response are to the recovery process. In New Orleans no action was taken to reduce 
the risks from the inadequate protection from the levees, evacuation was not planned 
satisfactorily prior to the disaster and there was no plan on how to evacuate people 
after the event, this added to the poor response to injured and stranded people. 
Recovery has been slow, many people have not yet returned and it is likely that many 
will not return to New Orleans. The local officials, including police officers have lost 
credibility with the citizens and this has added strain to the recovery process. This 
example shows that incorporating reduction, readiness and response into pre event 
recovery plans can help to improve the overall recovery. Even if it simply ensures that 
the residents of the area continue to trust the decision makers, this will help reduce 
conflict that may arise during recovery decisions.   
Legislation in New Zealand controls development and protects the environment. 
However as previously discussed this legislation is not designed to be incorporated 
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into recovery plans. Currently the best arrangement available to councils to include 
recovery plans is the LTCCP (Becker et al, 2006; Claire Hatfield and Angela Read, 
pers comms, 2007), however there are still drawbacks to using this plan for recovery. 
At present even if the LTCCP was used as a recovery plan it could not be used 
independently. Regional and District plans, the CDEM Act, Building Act and the 
RMA will still need to be used. If the LTCCP was used as a pre event recovery plan it 
may not coordinate effectively with this other legislation. It may also inhibit changes 
to this legislation which could improve recovery.  Including recovery plans in the long 
term plan may also inhibit recovery as it may lengthen or disrupt some procedures 
such as identifying a debris disposal site and undertaking a feasibility study prior to a 
disaster. This may cause conflict with the community.  
Conclusion
The recovery of Napier after the 1931 earthquake was remarkably successful 
for an era where the community did not fully understand the mechanisms 
behind the disaster or had very little pre planning.   
Napier included in its recovery many mitigation factors which are surprising 
considering it was not known what caused earthquakes. The most impressive 
of these was the new national building code which required buildings to be 
earthquake resistant.  
The recovery of Napier would occur differently today as communities have 
evolved. There is more legislation to control clean up and rebuilding, more 
companies are privately owned compared to state owned service providers in 
1931. There are also more globalised companies in today’s cities which may 
conflict with recovery strategies.  
Pre event recovery plans help to resolve issues that may occur during recovery 
and help to make sound decisions after the disaster compared to hurried, 
unprepared choices. They are helpful during recovery to ensure that issues 
have already been addressed prior to the event and can help reduce the time 
taken to recover. 
A recovery plan for New Zealand can be constructed although it needs to take 
the form of a framework within which the individual systems that exist can 
address their own specific circumstances. Currently the best plan which could 
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accommodate a pre event recovery plan is the LTCCP although there are some 
drawbacks to using this as the basis for a recovery strategy.  
Where a large disaster could have a devastating effect on a large area for 
example the Alpine fault as well as local plans a national plan could be 
developed also.    
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Chapter 8 - Conclusions  
Worldwide, the risks from natural and technological hazards has been mounting at an 
accelerating rate, improvements in forecasting and warning systems have reduced 
deaths, however monetary losses from disasters are overwhelming (Burby, 2004). 
Land suitable for development is becoming increasingly scarce and for this reason 
development often occurs on land subject to natural hazards. A natural hazard 
becomes a disaster when it affects community that is exposed to risk (Uitto, 1997; 
Alexander, 1993 in Cross, 2001).   
Recovery takes occurs in two phases short term- where services are repaired and long 
term where the level of services are returned to the pre disaster level.   
Pre event planning for recovery helps to resolve issues before the disaster so recovery 
is more efficient and effective. It also ensures that the window of opportunity can be 
used to implement hazard mitigation measures to reduce the vulnerability of the area 
with the aim of improving resilience for the next disaster. Two of the most critical 
processes to occur during pre event planning and recovery are strong leadership and 
communication between agencies that will enable the successful recovery of a 
community (Rubin, 1985 in Ying Wi and Lindell, 2004).   
Northridge earthquake was the most successful recovery of the case studies as it 
showed that prior planning, effective response and attention to vulnerable populations 
to ensure that they recover along with the rest of the community leads to a successful 
recovery. Hurricane Katrina shows that a lack of pre planning, indecisive officials and 
a slow and ineffective response can have a dramatic effect on recovery. It is 
imperative that city officials act in the best interests for all residents. Many residents 
no longer trust the city officials and this has slowed recovery.   
The lack of pre event planning before the Boxing Day Tsunami has slowed recovery 
as rebuilding has had to wait until plans are developed and formalised. In some cases 
there has been a lack of consultation with the community and this has added extra 
time to planning as conflict arises between the community and officials. 
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The recovery of the Napier 1931 earthquake was chosen as a New Zealand case study; 
to date this is the country’s worst disaster. Over all the recovery of Napier was a 
success, shops were opened in temporary premises to keep the economy going, 
mitigation measures were included in the rebuilding. The earthquake has had 
important flow on effects to how disasters are managed in New Zealand. A new 
National building code was created after the earthquake and earthquake insurance 
became compulsory. The earthquake also played a part in the formation of Civil 
Defence and how disaster funding is allocated. If this recovery were to occur today it 
would be more complex as we live in different communities, have more contact with 
other countries and have more scientific understanding and legislation.   
To create pre event plans in New Zealand legislation needs to be modified to include 
recovery plans and develop shortcuts to reduce some procedures which would 
lengthen the recovery process such as resource consents. These plans need to take into 
account our national vulnerability as well as regional vulnerabilities.   
Recommendations for Further Work
The likelihood of a disaster that will affect a large area of New Zealand is a situation 
which needs more attention. This situation cover a broad range of topics that could 
each be investigated further for example the response to the disaster, the recovery and 
further effects to the economy, communities and environment.   
More research is required to identify ways in which recovery legislation can be 
conveyed from the CDEM Act 2002 into local government policy without taking up 
enormous resources.   
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Appendix A  
Legislation Section/Part Relevance to Natural Hazard Management 
Resource 
Management 
Act 1991 
Part 2 Part 2 explains the purpose of the Act and identifies 
matters of national importance and other matters e.g. 
climate change 
s30 States that Regional Councils have responsibility to 
control the use of use for the avoidance or mitigation 
of natural hazards. 
s35 Territorial authorities (district or city council) have to 
responsibility to control the effects of the use of the 
land for the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards 
s59-62 Preparation of Regional Policy Statement, including 
reference to natural hazards 
s63-68 Preparation of Regional Plans in accordance with 
functions, this includes avoidance or mitigation of 
natural hazards 
s72-76 Preparation of District Plans in accordance with 
functions, this includes avoidance or mitigation of 
natural hazards  
s106 Subdivision consent can be refused, or granted subject 
to conditions, including conditions relating to natural 
hazards 
s220 Allow conditions to be placed on subdivision 
consents, including specific requirements 
s229 Purposes of esplanade reserves and esplanade strips to 
contribute to the protection of conservation values by, 
mitigating natural hazards 
s329-330B Provides for the issuing of water shortage directions to 
apportion, restrict or suspend the taking, use, 
damming or diversion of water at any time there is a 
serious temporary water shortage; and resource 
consent exceptions for immediate preventative or 
remedial works as a result of natural hazards, and for 
works undertaken in accordance with the Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. 
4th Schedule Matters that should be considered when preparing an 
assessment of effects on the environment, any person 
preparing an assessment of the effects on the 
environment should consider any risk to the neighbour 
hood, the wider community, or the environment 
through natural hazards.  
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Appendix B  
Social Dependency Matrix 
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Housing New 
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4 5 2 2 2 4 3 3 3 4 4 2 4 1 2 
WINZ 5 5 2 3 3 5 3 3 4 3 3 2 4 1 1 
District Health 
Board 
5 2 3 5 5 3 4 3 3 4 4 1 4 2 1 
Local 
hospitals 
5 2 3 5 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 1 4 4 1 
National 
Hospitals 
4 2 3 5 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 1 4 3 1 
Inland 
Revenue 
3 4 4 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 1 3 1 1 
Insurance 
Providers 
4 3 2 4 3 3 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 1 3 
Police 5 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 0 3 2 2 2 4 5 5 
CYF 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 4 1 1 
Salvation 
Army 
5 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 4 1 1 
Red Cross 5 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 4 1 1 
RNZSPCA 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 
Media 5 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 5 4 5 5 4 3 3 
St John 
Ambulance 
4 1 1 3 5 5 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 3 5 
Fire Brigade 4 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 5 1 1 2 1 3 5 
                                
Total 65 44 45 50 51 45 38 41 44 38 43 47 25 56 34 31 
Scale  
1= Low Level of Communication 
5= High Level of Communication          
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Economic Dependency Matrix 
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New Zealand Trade and 
Enterprise 
3 4 3 0 5 4 5 3 5 3 5 5 
Ministry of Economic 
development 
5 5 4 4 0 5 3 4 5 3 5 5 
Inland Revenue 3 4 4 4 4 0 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Insurance Providers 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 2 3 4 3 4 
Non- Governmental Organisations 3 4 4 5 5 3 3 0 3 3 3 3 
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Total 15 17 17 15 14 
